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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1772

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## ARMED FORCES

### ARMY GEN V. PETROV ON STALINGRAD BATTLE

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 83 p 3

[Article by Army Gen V. Petrov, HSU, CIC of Ground Forces, USSR deputy minister of defense: "Immortal Exploit of Stalingrad"]

[Text] During these days the Soviet people, their famed Armed Forces, toilers of socialist countries, and people of good will of the whole planet are celebrating the 40th anniversary of the defeat of fascist German troops at Stalingrad. This was a supreme battle of world-historic importance. The victory at Stalingrad made a deciding contribution toward attaining a fundamental turning point not only in the Great Patriotic War, but in all of World War II. It marked the beginning of the mass expulsion of fascist invaders from the borders of our Motherland. The strategic initiative finally was wrested from the hands of a crafty enemy. Our victory at Stalingrad largely determined the destiny of the nations of Europe and the outcome of struggle between the forces of progress and the fascist reaction.

Soviet citizens celebrate this banner date in our Motherland's history in an atmosphere of great political enthusiasm and new labor achievements in the struggle to implement the historic outlines of the 26th CPSU Congress, quotas of the 11th Five-Year Plan and the national Food Program. The Soviet power's economic successes and achievements in the building of communism are the best monuments to the heroes who fell in the Battle of Stalingrad.

[, The Battle of Stalingrad surpassed all battles and engagements of the past in its scope and importance. Hitler Germany threw over half of all its tank units [soyedineniye] and almost two-fifths of all infantry units at the Eastern Front to this area. The enemy grouping formed on the Stalingrad axis, with its basis being the 6th Army--one of the most combat-effective armies of Germany--surpassed Soviet troops by 1.7 times in personnel, 1.3 times in artillery and tanks and by more than twofold in aircraft. By the fall of 1942 the enemy succeeded in penetrating to the Volga at the cost of enormous losses.

Hitler's armored armadas were at its shores not only because the fascist German army at that time had a superiority in ground forces and tanks, and especially in aviation, but also because our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition--England and the United States--were in no hurry to give the Soviet Union effective help. They essentially sabotaged the opening of a second front.

The U.S. and British refusal to open a second front in Europe in 1942 complicated the Soviet Army's position and harmed the Soviet command's plans. American, British and other western historians now are shamefully silent about this. To suit the anti-Soviet course of their ruling circles, they give distorted estimates of events and the course and outcome of World War II, including the Battle of Stalingrad. This battle serves as a convincing reminder that there are no forces in the world capable of crushing the new type of army, an army which has its roots in the thick of the popular masses, an army with a combat might and combat readiness which rely directly on the great advantages of the socialist state and social system, an army which was formed and grows constantly stronger thanks to the ever-growing directing work of the Communist Party in the area of military organizational development.

The Battle of Stalingrad is divided into two periods: a defensive period (from 17 July through 18 November 1942) and an offensive period from 19 November 1942 through 2 February 1943. The defensive engagement in the area between the Volga and Don rivers lasted 125 fiery days and nights. It seemed there was no force in the world capable of withstanding the blow of Hitler's war machine. By the end of 12 September 1942 enemy troops stood at the walls of the Tractor Plant and on 13 September the Hitlerites began an assault on the Volga stronghold. They delivered the main attack in the direction of Mamayev Kurgan and the train station. By the end of the day the enemy held the train station and penetrated to the Volga. The fascist leadership already was considering the question of victory at Stalingrad predetermined.

The subsequent course of events showed that the presumptuous Hitlerite warriors had celebrated the victory early. In fierce fighting which did not abate for four months Soviet troops fought the enemy steadfastly and courageously and displayed wonders of heroism.

The intensity of the fighting rose with every hour. City streets and squares became an arena of bloody fighting which did not let up until the end of the battle. The simple words, full of deep meaning: "Not a step backward!" and "There is no land for us beyond the Volga!" became law for every defender of Stalingrad.

The enemy lost around 700,000 killed or wounded, more than 2,000 guns and mortars, over 1,000 tanks and assault guns and more than 1,400 combat and transport aircraft in the fierce defensive battle between the Volga and Don. All this bled dry the grouping of Hitlerite troops at Stalingrad and created favorable conditions for the Soviet Armed Forces to move into a decisive counteroffensive.

II. It was during the defensive battle that the Soviet command began elaborating a plan for defeating the enemy. Its primary objective was to wrest the strategic initiative from the enemy's hands in the winter campaign of 1942-1943, inflict heavy damage on him and thus achieve a decisive turning point in the course of the war.

The plan for the Soviet Army's counteroffensive at Stalingrad was drawn up on the basis of proposals of prominent Soviet military leaders G. K. Zhukov and

A. M. Vasilevskiy and was approved by Supreme Commander I. V. Stalin. The General Staff performed further work on the plan. Commanders in chief of combat arms and the Air Force CIC were included in the work. In the first days of October military councils and staffs of the fronts operating in the Stalingrad vicinity were included in drawing up the counteroffensive plan.

The essence of the plan for the counteroffensive by Soviet troops was to deliver strong, surprise flank attacks along converging axes toward Kalach and Sovetskiy for the purpose of encircling the enemy grouping operating between the Volga and Don and subsequently unfolding a broad offensive right up to the defeat of the entire southern wing of the German Eastern Front.

Strategic reserves were formed secretly and the troops' technical outfitting was improved for implementing the plan. Much attention was given to organizing continuous, purposeful party-political work with personnel. Commanders, political entities and party organizations tried to raise the soldiers' morale even higher and readjust their psychological mood from defense to a decisive offensive. The best soldiers who had distinguished themselves in preceding fighting entered the ranks of the Leninist party.

At 0730 hours on 19 November 1942 troops of the Southwest and Don fronts moved into the counteroffensive after a powerful artillery preparation and a day later troops of the Stalingrad Front did the same. A little more than four days went by when there was a historic meeting of mobile troops of two fronts in the vicinity of Sovetskiy. The ring closed firmly about the encircled troop grouping. In it was the Hitlerite 6th Army, which had crossed Europe in a victorious march, and a portion of the units of the 4th Panzer Army--22 fascist divisions and 160 units [chast'] for an overall total of 330,000 persons with numerous pieces of military equipment.

The Hitlerite command tried to free its troops gripped in the ring. To this end it hastily created a striking force of divisions operating in the North Caucasus and which had arrived from Western Europe. The enemy attack grouping was shifted from the vicinity of Kotel'nikovskiy to break through the encirclement, but it suffered defeat as a result of decisive actions by troops of the Southwest and Stalingrad fronts.

A new, powerful offensive by Soviet troops on the Middle Don contributed to the enemy grouping's defeat. In ten days they advanced 150-200 km. The plans for raising the blockade of Paulus' Hitlerite army located in the pocket thus were disrupted.

During subsequent fighting which lasted until 2 February 1943 Soviet troops eliminated the encircled enemy grouping once and for all and thus created necessary conditions for the counteroffensive to develop into a general strategic offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front.

Sons of Russia and the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic, the Caucasus and Siberia, and the Far East and Central Asia stood shoulder to shoulder in the trenches of Stalingrad. The great strength of fraternal unity of our nations and the combat friendship and mutual support by soldiers of different nations

was reflected in the Soviet Army victory on the banks of the Volga. World history has not known a multinational army to possess such unity and unshakable solidarity of its ranks as were inherent in the socialist army. This monolithic nature and invincibility are the result of our party's wise Leninist policy of nationalities.

The victory at Stalingrad was a victory of Soviet military art. Under the leadership of the Supreme High Command, a great contribution was made to this victory by prominent military leaders comrades G. Zhukov, A. Vasilevskiy, N. Vatutin, N. Voronov, A. Yeremenko, R. Malinovskiy, K. Rokossovskiy, K. Moskalenko, M. Shumilov, S. Rudenko, D. Lelyushenko, V. Chuykov, P. Batov and others.

By the beginning of the counteroffensive in the area between the Volga and Don rivers our front and army CIC's and division commanders had acquired experience in command and control and an ability to accomplish offensive operations. The Battle of Stalingrad, during which two very large strategic operations--a defensive and an offensive operation--were conducted was a triumph of Soviet military art and of its superiority over the Hitlerite military art. It must be noted that our troops' operational and tactical defense was characterized by a sharp increase in its depth, reinforcement with antitank weapons, and the capable combination of determined holding of important positions and lines with strong counterattacks and counterblows.

The success of the Soviet troops' counteroffensive largely was determined by secret preparations for it, the attainment of surprise in delivering attacks, as well as skillfully and precisely arranged coordination and the daring, bold and resolute use of mobile tank and mechanized units [soyedineniye] for exploiting success of the offensive at high rates and to a great depth. In this sense the experience of the Battle of Stalingrad was very useful and played an important part in successful accomplishment of subsequent engagements and operations of the Great Patriotic War right up to the assault on Berlin and liberation of Czechoslovakia's capital of Prague.

The victory at Stalingrad was won because the rear and front were unified. They lived, worked and fought for the sake of one goal--to defeat the enemy. Thanks to titanic work by the Communist Party and selfless labor of the Soviet citizens, a smooth-running, fast-growing war economy had been created by the fall of 1942. The enormous material-technical capacities of socialist industry and agriculture, achievements of science and technology and available resources were mobilized and activated for supporting the armed struggle.

The outstanding importance of the Battle of Stalingrad and the triumph of Soviet military art received the highest praise and wide recognition throughout the world, but during the postwar period some bourgeois military historians, by falsifying well-known facts, have been attempting to degrade the importance of the Battle of Stalingrad and have been trying to place it in the same category as less important events which occurred, for example, in the North African theater of military operations at El Alamein, or to be silent about it entirely.

In falsifying the true state of affairs bourgeois historians are making an effort to prove that successful actions by Soviet troops at Stalingrad, and not only here on the banks of the Volga, but at other fronts as well, largely were facilitated by Lend Lease deliveries of combat equipment from the United States and England. Yes, they proved useful, and we admit this, but they were negligible in comparison with what our armies needed. They forget about this.

The following argument also is in vogue among bourgeois historians: The defeat of the Wehrmacht army at Stalingrad allegedly was only the result of Soviet superiority in personnel and logistical support, even though it is well known--no one ever concealed it--that our superiority in forces and weapons was comparatively small. It could be a question of something else: that the Soviet command managed to create a superiority over the enemy in the breakthrough sectors by massing personnel and weapons, but creating such a superiority is military art.

The international importance of our victory at Stalingrad is great. It contributed to an upsurge in the national liberation struggle against fascism, inspired the enslaved peoples of Europe and showed that there was a force--the Soviet Army--capable of crushing Hitler's war machine.

III. The more time that passes, the more that the importance of the world-historic victory at Stalingrad stands out. The heroism of Soviet soldiers who defended the famed city in the defensive battle and later crushed the encircled grouping of elite Hitlerite troops during the grandiose counter-offensive is a supreme spiritual property of our people. The exploits by heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad teach new generations of Soviet citizens allegiance to the Motherland, the party and the ideals of Marxism-Leninism. We indoctrinate today's officers and men--patriots and internationalists--in the combat traditions of the Stalingrad soldiers. The experience of operations accomplished at Stalingrad is being researched thoroughly by military historians, studied at academies and higher military schools, and used in the combat training of our units and subunits.

Stalingrad was a superb school of strategic, operational and tactical proficiency. New forms of tactical employment not only of troop formations and units but also of squads, assault teams, platoons and companies appeared during this battle. The soldiers displayed not only steadfastness, courage and valor, but also military ability, initiative and soldiers' gumption in fighting the enemy. We strive to ensure that our Armed Forces subunits and units possess such an ability today and that they persistently master the science of winning forged in fighting for the Motherland.

The Battle of Stalingrad gives grounds for serious conclusions of creative military-scientific thinking. I will refer only to a few. Hitler's command gambled on its so-called panzer spearheads and on armadas of aircraft. The lessons of Stalingrad confirmed a general conclusion of our military doctrine that victory is won through the efforts of all combat arms and all branches of the armed forces. The victory at Stalingrad showed that adventurism in politics and in warmaking inevitably leads to defeat.



Stalingrad serves as a serious lesson for those who love to build relationships with states and determine their doctrines on the basis of adventurism, and such adventure lovers have not disappeared even in our time.

In evaluating the work of the Prague conference of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact member nations, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said in answering questions of RUDE PRAVO: "The primary conclusion of all our comradely exchange of opinions at the conference could be defined as follows: A further strengthening of our unity and our economic and defense potential must be the answer to calculations by aggressive imperialist circles to crowd socialism back. It will be correct to say that both the security of our countries and the destiny of the world as a whole are directly connected with this."

The powerful combat equipment which the Motherland presented to its defenders today is in capable and reliable hands. The Communist Party armed them with Marxist-Leninist teaching which contains an inexhaustible source of ideological maturity, political awareness, combat activeness and class hatred for the aggressor. There are regiments in our troops' order of battle beneath the colors of which fought riflemen, tankmen, artillerymen and pilots who accomplished the crushing defeat between the Volga and Don. Today these are the foremost units of our grand Armed Forces, our beacons.

Soviet Army and Navy personnel are true to the heroic traditions of the Stalingrad heroes. Soviet military personnel stand vigilantly on guard over our Motherland, on guard over peace on earth.

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## ARMED FORCES

### INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES CITED

Moscow NAUCHNYY KOMMUNIZM in Russian No 1, 1983 (signed to press 19 Jan 83)  
pp 3-10

[Article by O.A. Bel'kov, candidate of philosophical sciences: "The Military-Patriotic Importance of the Soviet People's International Unity"]

[Text] The 60th anniversary of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics bears witness to socialism's historic achievements and the triumph of the CPSU's Leninist national policy. "On this glorious anniversary," the CPSU Central Committee's decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the USSR" states, "the Soviet Union is for the entire world a harmonious family of equal republics jointly building communism" (Moscow, 1982, p 3). The solid unity of the country's more than 100 nations and ethnic groups has become that great force which makes the grandest plans for economic, political, social and cultural progress a reality, which provides reliable security for the socialist homeland.

The inviolable unity of the interests and goals, the will and the actions of all our country's nations and ethnic groups, their spiritual kinship and mutual concern are the main conditions assuring that the conquests of socialism and the invulnerability of the Soviet borders are protected. The Soviet people's historic victories over numerous enemies and the nation's indestructible defense graphically confirm V.I. Lenin's words to the effect that the democratic organization of relationships among nations is actually an important condition for the strengthening of the unity of our forces and our rear area.

The great fraternity of people of labor, the feeling of belonging to a united family and the friendship of peoples, which have become firmly established in our nation, are inexhaustible sources of strength and invincibility for the multi-national socialist state. Our military power is the sum total of our state's material and spiritual strengths, its ability to mobilize these forces for the national defense. The components of our military power--our economic, social, scientific and technological, political and spiritual potentials--taken in their dialectic unity, define the defense capability itself. In our multi-national state these potentials and the possible limits to their employment for military purposes depend to a significant degree upon the nature of relationships existing among the nations.

Severe national conflicts, raging nationalism, chauvinism and racism in the capitalist nations leave their stamp also on the bourgeois armies. This is especially typical of the USA. The Pentagon, for example, has legalized the racist separation of servicemen into "whites," "blacks," "yellows" and "reds." Ku Klux Klan organizations operate openly and with impunity, with the obvious support of high-ranking people. It is not surprising that there are many servicemen in the American army, who believe that the American armed forces "are precisely that institution in which one can openly and productively persecute and repress Negroes and all those who attempt to protect them" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 May 1982).

Only socialism is capable of resolving the national question, of establishing friendship among peoples and turning it into a powerful means of protecting the socialist conquests of the workers. For the first time in history, the multinational nature of the state in our nation is serving as a factor in our society's strength. We can identify four areas in which the international unity of peoples of the USSR has a beneficial effect with respect to increasing the nation's defense capability and strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces.

In the first place, the fact that they are solidly united in a single union accelerates the social and economic development of all the nations and ethnic groups making up the nation. This, in turn, increases the contribution made by each of them to the accomplishment of the state's defense tasks and makes it possible to take full and effective advantage of their capabilities in the interest of jointly ensuring our nation's security.

The Soviet economy is the sum total of the economies of the individual republics and oblasts. It constitutes a single national economic complex, which has developed within the boundaries of the entire nation and forms the material foundation for the fraternal friendship of peoples of the USSR. The intensive development of the nations and ethnic groups and the scientifically based cooperation and specialization of the republic economies are accomplished within the framework of this complex. As the 26th CPSU Congress noted, the party's course is one of "building up the material and spiritual strength of each republic, while at the same time, making maximum use of it for the balanced development of the entire nation" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [26th CPSU Congress Materials], Moscow, 1981, p 55). The party regards this as an essential condition for the strengthening of the USSR's economic and defensive might.

During the prewar years of our economic development, the party felt that the zoning of industry should conform to our strategic security needs. It was not possible to totally accomplish this during the period when we were building socialism, however. Not long before the Great Patriotic War defense industry enterprises were located in several industrial centers. Tank construction was carried out in Leningrad and Kharkov, for example, more than three-fourths of the combat aircraft were produced in the central part of the nation, and Tula was one of the producers of small arms.

During the years of the very first five-year plans, however, a definite industrial base was created where previously there had been primitive cottage industry or something not much more advanced. This enabled the nation to rapidly place 1,360 evacuated enterprises into operation and to build 2,250 large new industrial

installations, which produced combat equipment for the front. Nine out of ten bullets fired at the enemy were made of lead from Kazakhstan, for example, and seven out of every ten engines used Azerbaijan oil.

All of the republics now have a highly developed industry and agriculture. The economy of each republic occupies an important place in the public distribution of labor and is making an increasingly large contribution to the country's national wealth and to the strengthening of the state's defense capability. Just before the Great Patriotic War, the entire nation was producing 48.6 billion kilowatt-hours of electric energy annually, whereas in 1981 Kazakhstan alone produced 63.6 billion kilowatt-hours. The Ukraine has exceeded by almost 3-fold the prewar steel production for the entire Union. Bashkiria extracts more oil than was extracted in the nation in 1940. The state's possibilities for equipping the army and navy have grown correspondingly. Each of the Union republics, as Yu.V. Andropov noted in his report "The 60th Anniversary of the USSR," is making "an indispensable contribution to the general improvement of the Soviet Union's economy and culture. And this, comrades, is not simply addition of our creative strengths, but their multi-fold multiplication" (PRAVDA, 22 December 1982).

The Soviet Armed Forces, which, as the 26th CPSU Congress stressed, are technically equipped to a high degree and are the concentrated embodiment of the high level of development of the economy, science and technology achieved through the joint efforts of all our country's nations and ethnic groups. For example, the machine builders of such republics as the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, metallurgists of the Urals and Kazakhstan, miners in areas of Siberia and the Donbass, oil workers of Azerbaijan and Bashkiria, cotton growers of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia and the workers of all the country's republics and oblasts are helping to outfit the Soviet Army with modern weapons.

The economic flowering of the nations and ethnic groups is accompanied by progressive advances in their social structure and their spiritual make-up. Formerly, the low level of development of certain peoples retarded the preparation of their members for the performance of military service. In 1923, for example, the RKKA[Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] Staff provided for exempting from military duty nationalities "which, due to their existing historical and economic conditions and ways of life, cannot yet provide citizens for the Republic's defense, who are capable of performing the duties involved in the military service to the benefit of the revolution's defense under modern conditions" (VOYNA I REVOLUTSIYA, No 6, 1927, p 70).

Today, the most difficult military specialties can be mastered by members of every nation and ethnic group. The preparedness and fervent desire on the part of fightingmen of all nationalities to learn rapidly and to perfection how to handle the weapons entrusted to them are a result of socialism's great conquests, which have ended once and for all the centuries-old backwardness of the formerly remote areas. Today, fightingmen of all nationalities stand shoulder to shoulder in the ranks of the missilemen and submariners, tankmen and pilots, artillerymen and motorized riflemen. They include combat and political training experts, rated specialists and rationalizers. Such is one of the natural results of the Leninist national policy.

The increasing industrialization of military work is a typical feature of the modern army. Given the relatively brief period of military service, the use of the draftees depends in great part upon their civilian specialty. The state's social and national policy therefore affects the continuing development of its mobilization capabilities. Steps worked out at the 26th CPSU Congress to erase territorial social differences and to extensively train skilled workers of the indigenous nationalities in republics with an excess of workers, primarily from among the rural youth, will help to expand the social base for manning the technically complex services and branches of troops.

Another area which determines the importance of the Soviet people's international unity to defense involves the actual military organizational development, the creation and strengthening of the armed forces. "The USSR," the nation's Constitution reads, "personifies the state unity of the Soviet people and unites all the nations and ethnic groups for the purpose of jointly building communism" (p 70). The Soviet Army and Navy are a graphic reflection of the oneness of their political life, of the dialectical unity of Union and national statehood, and the living embodiment of socialist internationalism. "Our Armed Forces," Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, has said, "is the beloved offspring of the multi-national Soviet people, a new social and historical community of people." ("60 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR. Dokumenty i materialy"[Sixty Years of the Soviet Armed Forces: Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1978, p 32).

The Soviet Union is a powerful, united state. Its Armed Forces are prepared to repel an attack by any enemy, wherever it might originate, prepared to protect the security of each people in our fraternal family. It is important to stress this fact, since imperialism's strategists are attempting with far-reaching political goals to find a weak spot in our alliance. For example, the American Sovietologist Hostler, speaking out in defense of American expansionism with respect to the republics of the Soviet East, writes that "from the military standpoint the basic Turkic regions of the USSR's southern territory are the vulnerable spot" of the Soviet Union. These malicious anti-communist conclusions are not in conformity with the reality. Defending the national borders of the Soviet republics is the cause of all the peoples of the USSR. There are no weak or defenseless nations within the Soviet State. "The sovereign rights of the Union republics," states the Constitution of the USSR, "are protected by the USSR" (p 81). All of the republics have an equal interest in strengthening the nation's economic, political and military might. For them, the protection of their sovereignty is inseparable from the defense of the USSR--a dynamic and effective form of state association of the Soviet nations and ethnic groups.

We know that the previous Constitution of the USSR gave the Soviet republics the right to have their own military formations. Not one of them actually took advantage of this right, however. The 1977 Constitution of the USSR does not contain this provision. Matters of war and peace, the protection and guarding of the state borders and the territory of the USSR, the organization of our defense and the direction of the Armed Forces of the USSR are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the USSR in the form of its highest agencies of state power and administration (p 73).

On the other hand, all of the republics, all of the nations and ethnic groups participate equally in the work of strengthening our united homeland's security. The victory over German fascism demonstrated the invincible strength of the solidarity of free peoples. The fascist leaders believed that there was no fraternal unity in the Soviet Union and that the international hostility allegedly existing here would make it easy for them to conquer the USSR. Such frivolous ideas were actively disseminated in the other imperialist states as well. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, for example, the British newspaper DAILY MAIL wrote that the USSR, "which consists of an enormous number of diverse nations, might fall apart upon encountering a military situation" (quoted from TRUD, 28 February 1982).

The war destroyed world imperialism's hopes for the collapse of the multi-national socialist state, however. The nations and ethnic groups of the USSR fought heroically in single formation on the fronts and worked selflessly in the rear area to protect their homeland. The brunt of the war against fascism was borne by the Russian people. The Ukrainian, Belorussian and other peoples of the USSR made a worthy contribution to the common cause of defeating the enemy, along with the Russians. There were around 12 million fightingmen in the ranks of our multi-national Armed Forces by the summer of 1943. They were members of almost 500 divisions and a large number of separate brigades. Many brigades were formed with the people and the material resources of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Estonia. During the war years, mainly during the difficult months of 1941, those republics put together more than 80 divisions and separate brigades, which battled the aggressor vigorously and selflessly.

The sons and daughters of all the country's nationalities fought in all the battles which developed over the enormous Soviet-German front throughout the entire 1,418 long days of the war. "During the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War," the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the USSR" states, "the fraternal peoples fought shoulder to shoulder to defend the homeland, displayed mass heroism and an indomitable will for victory, routed the fascist invaders and saved the world's peoples from enslavement and annihilation" (p 6). A high level of military-patriotic activeness is an inseparable feature of the way of life for the nations and ethnic groups of the USSR in the contemporary situation. The addition of special sections on the defense of the socialist homeland to the constitutions of the Union republics reflects their concern for the fate of the Soviet homeland. Fulfilling the requirements set forth in the nation's Fundamental Law, all of the nations and ethnic groups are implementing the Leninist precept regarding the need to strengthen the national defense and are participating in the development and improvement of the multi-national Armed Forces of the USSR. Having assumed leadership of the military organizational development, the CPSU is conducting it in such a way that, as M.V. Frunze stated back then, not a single nationality of our Union feels that it has been slighted or neglected.

The enormous significance of this demand is especially apparent when we compare what we have today with the situation under tsarism. The Russian autocracy feared its citizens of other nationalities. One of the documents issued by the war ministry at that time stated: "We cannot consider it desirable to introduce into the non-Russian Moslem population each year even a small number of individuals .

capable of handling weapons well, on whose loyalty we cannot depend." Members of more than 40 peoples were not accepted into the army for political reasons.

The first enactments of Soviet authorities eliminated all discrimination against different nationalities with respect to military service. The decree on the organization of the Red Army stated: "Anyone prepared to give his strengths and his life to defend the conquests of the October Revolution, the power of the soviets and socialism can enter the Red Army." Thanks to the steps which were taken, fightingmen of around 50 nationalities fought in the Red Army ranks during the civil war, alongside the Russians (read A.S. Stepanov, "Velikiy Oktryabr' i natsional'naya politika KPSS"[Great October and the National Policy of the CPSU], Moscow, 1982, p 15). With their common efforts they all produced the victory over the enemies of the revolution. This is still an undeviating principle underlying Soviet military organizational development. Universal military duty is the law in our nation. In accordance with this law, it is the honored duty of Soviet citizens to perform military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR. "All male citizens of the USSR, regardless of origin, social position, wealth, race or nationality, education, language, attitude toward religion, type or nature of employment or place of residence, are required to perform active military duty in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR" ("Zakon SSSR o vseobshchey voinskoy obyazannosti"[Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty], Moscow, 1981, p 3).

The inviolable unity of the Soviet people--a new historical community of people--provides a broad social and national base for manning the army. For the first time in history, the state's entire population constitutes this base. Members of all classes and social groups, all the nations and ethnic groups of our great homeland, serve in single formation.

The intensification of the economic and political community of nations entails the internationalization of their territories. Even now, more than a fourth of the populations of 10 Union republics are not members of the nationalities which gave the republics their names. Because of this, the extra-territorial principle for manning the forces is taking on new meaning. During the period of socialist development, the military command attempted "where possible, to permit citizens of the Transcaucasus and Central Asian republics to fulfill their military obligation within their own republics..." (POLITRABOTNIK, No 11, 1923, p 164). All of the nation's peoples demonstrated their oneness during the Great Patriotic War. This was expressed well by the Uzbek people in a letter to the Uzbek soldiers: "...The Soviet Union is a harmonious family, in which each individual lives in his own home, but the yard and management are united and inseparable" (PRAVDA, 31 October 1942). Today, however, all the peoples, all the Soviet people, realize and know from their own experience that not only are the yard and management united and inseparable, but their home as well. The awareness and the feeling of belonging to a single, multi-national family of builders of communism and personal involvement in the grand reforms being carried out in all areas of our immense homeland are producing the conviction that wherever the military service is performed, it is necessary to the homeland, to every nation and ethnic group, to every family.

Today, we find Armenian fightingmen in the Polar Regions, Russians and Ukrainians in Central Asia, Georgians and Kazakhs in the Carpathian area, Belorussians and

Estonians in the Transcaucasus. This is only natural, because it is all our great common homeland. Today, not only the nation's Armed Forces as a whole, but every unit and ship, every subunit, is multi-national. And the Soviet Army is the repository of the progressive national traditions of the peoples. Their military experience accumulated over a period of many centuries of fighting against foreign invaders and the combat traditions which developed in battles of the past and have been enriched and developed in the battles for socialism constitute our common possession. It is reliably helping the Armed Forces of the USSR to fulfill their constitutional duty--"to reliably defend the socialist homeland and be in a constant state of combat readiness assuring an immediate rebuff to any aggressor" (p 31). Within the combat fraternity of various nationalities, everything valuable in the character of the peoples and in their experience in life organically merges with the basic interests of the workers. The remarkable fighting qualities of the Soviet people of all nationalities have become firmly established on this basis. "And each time it is required in the interest of national security and the defense of peace, each time it is necessary to help the victims of aggression," the 26th CPSU Congress stated, "the Soviet fighting-man stands before the world as an altruistic and courageous patriot and internationalist, prepared to surmount any difficulties" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 66).

The third area which reveals the defensive importance of the international unity of the new, historical community of people, is the fact that the sense of friendship of peoples, which is reflected in the awareness and the conduct of the fightingmen, permeates the entire life of the army and navy. It unites the military collectives into a monolithic entity and helps them to successfully perform all the tasks. Because of this, the multi-national nature of the Armed Forces is a source of moral steadfastness and combat activeness on the part of the fightingmen. The inner unity of the nation's Armed Forces and the friendship and mutual assistance of fightingmen in the multi-national army increase its combat strength and create conditions conducive to the manifestation of each nationality's best qualities. This is what Uzbek fightingmen of the 1st Belorussian Front wrote to their people, as an example: "...we sense with special acuteness that the homeland is incomparably larger and greater than Uzbekistan alone. There is no homeland for us without the united alliance of the fraternal peoples which populate the USSR. There is no homeland or life for us without the clear skies over Moscow. For us, the homeland is the banks of the Volga, the steppes of the Ukraine and the land of Belorussia, copiously soaked with our blood. ...It is these lofty feelings, the sense of duty to the homeland and to the fraternal peoples, the sense of friendship and mutual aid, which are producing more and more heroes among us" ("Pis' ma s fronta" [Letters From the Front], Tashkent, 1965, pp 99-100).

The historic victory in the great battle against the Hitlerite invaders was a triumph of proletarian internationalism over the nationalistic ideology of facism. This victory brilliantly demonstrated the invincible strength of the solidarity of free nations.

The importance of friendship and fraternity of peoples is even greater today. It is helping the fightingmen to successfully learn to handle the complex equipment and weapons and modern combat techniques, and to strengthen their combat



readiness. The multi-national military collective is a single combat family, in which each individual has confidence in his comrade and is readiness himself to come to the comrade's assistance at any time. The joint military work transforms the friendship of peoples into a profound personal feeling, an aware moral standard governing the serviceman's conduct. The rigorous army workdays make the friendship of each fightingman a real schooling in international indoctrination. Well-conceived, skilfully organized, persistent ideological and indoctrinational work makes this indoctrination highly effective.

During the performance of alert duty, the organization of the daily life of the fightingmen and the summing up of results in the socialist competition, in the propaganda lectures, in the performance of fatigue duty and during leisure hours, the commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations devote prime attention to the continuing uniting of the military collectives. A good knowledge of the Russian language, which is the language of international communication among the Soviet people and as such, serves the needs of the multi-national army and navy, has an important role in this. Data obtained in the latest census of the population indicate that we have a growing number of people who speak the Russian language fluently. Because of this, more and more draftees are entering the army each year, for whom there are no barriers to the mastery of military affairs. And this is having a good effect with respect to the rapid development of the military specialists and the strengthening of mutual understanding and solidarity in the multi-national collectives.

What we have said does not mean that there is no longer a problem with respect to the mastering of the Russian language. In the first place, a knowledge of the Russian language is highly important to the nation's entire population, including the draft-age youth. In the second place, the increased complexity of military affairs is making greater demands with respect to the knowledge of that language which is the basis for the military training and indoctrination. This is why the Communist Party and the Soviet State concern themselves constantly with improving the teaching of the Russian language in the national school. It is a language of great political, economic, cultural and military importance.

Finally, the importance of the international unity of the Soviet people and the Armed Forces is not just national in scope. The great humanism of the international relations which have become firmly established in the USSR is also manifested in the nature of the military policy and the methods used to implement it. The brutal deeds perpetrated by the fascists in the territories they occupied, the "scorched earth" tactic employed by the American army in Vietnam, the crimes against humanity committed by the British expeditionary corps in Ulster and the Israeli military's policy toward the Arab people attest to the fact that such actions are characteristic of any imperialist army, an army indoctrinated in misanthropic principles. For the socialist state, general democratic principles, particularly respect for human rights and the basic freedoms, are the determining factors in military activities as well. The socialist army never fights the population of the opposing nation, especially a peaceful one. Indoctrinated in a spirit of respect for all the workers of the world, it cannot become a prisoner to nationalistic passions.

The entire world knows that even during the dire period of World War II, the Soviet people did not associate Germany's workers with the criminal Hitlerite

clique. On the eve of the Battle for Berlin, PRAVDA wrote that the Soviet Army was "fulfilling its liberation mission and fighting to eliminate the Hitlerite army, the Hitlerite state and the Hitlerite government, but had never set itself the goal and would not set itself the goal of destroying the German people."

During the war the socialist army was the agent of state policy with respect to the populations of the liberated (or temporarily occupied) territories. The armed forces were only capable of successfully accomplishing their great mission by giving exceptional consideration to the national characteristics of the specific people, by showing the most profound respect for their national traditions. The establishment of extensive ties with the local population and the internationalist policy toward them met with understanding and support on the part of the broad masses of workers, and this was highly important to the outcome of combat operations conducted by the troops. During World War II, for example, interaction between Soviet Army units and the partisan and national liberation movement and the conduct of joint operations with the newly created armies of a number of European states was an important and effective form of international combat solidarity of peoples.

The Leninist principles of international military unity of the workers underwent further development in the Warsaw Pact, a defensive military and political alliance of the socialist commonwealth nations. It possesses everything it needs to reliably protect the socialist conquests of the peoples. "Imperialism's aggressive intrigues," Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated at the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "are forcing us, together with the other fraternal socialist states, to concern ourselves, and to concern ourselves seriously, with maintaining our defense capability at the proper level.... The strengthening of the socialist commonwealth will continue to be our party's primary concern. In unity is our strength and a guarantee of ultimate success even in the most serious trials" (PRAVDA, 23 November 1982).

And so, the solidarity and the international unity of the Soviet society affect the life and work of its military organization. They are an important condition for military organizational development. They determine the social and political characteristics of the army and navy, and their combat capability.

Large exercises and maneuvers conducted in recent years in various Soviet republics thoroughly tested the combat capability and the political maturity of the multi-national Armed Forces of the USSR, and constituted their accountability report to the people, the party and the government. They demonstrated a high level of combat training on the part of army and navy personnel and were a brilliant demonstration of their monolithic solidarity and their inseparable unity with the multi-national Soviet people. They confirmed the fact that the Armed Forces of the USSR are honorably fulfilling their constitutional duty to the people and reliably guarding their peaceful, creative labor.

The Soviet Army is a reliable guard over the conquests of socialism and the peaceful labor of our people. Together with all the workers of the USSR, they are striving for a relaxation of international tensions, struggling to prevent a nuclear war. As Yu.V. Andropov stated in his report "The 60th Anniversary of

the USSR," "there is presently no task more important than that of halting the initiators of another war. The vital interests of all peoples demand this. This is why the Soviet Union's unilateral commitment not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons was greeted with approval and hope throughout the world. If the other nuclear powers will follow our example, this will truly be an important contribution to the cause of preventing a nuclear war" (PRAVDA, 22 December 1982).

The CPSU's foreign policy is a policy of peace and detente, a policy of preventing a worldwide thermonuclear catastrophe. This policy conforms to the interests of all the peoples of our multi-national Soviet homeland and to the aspirations and hopes of all progressive mankind.

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## ARMED FORCES

### TECHNICAL TRAINING FOR SERVICEMEN

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYE in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 8 Dec 82) pp 6-7

[Article by Colonel A. Nikonorov: "Military Skill, Implement Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress!"]

[Text] A strong alloy of high levels of technical equipment, military skill and unshakable morale—this is the fighting potential of the Soviet Armed Forces.

from the CPSU Central Committee report to the 26th Party Congress.

What is the meaning of this concept? The Soviet Military Encyclopedia answers that question as follows: "Military skill is the high level of professional and specialized preparedness of each member of the armed forces individually and collectively by the personnel of military subunits [podrazdeleniye] and units [chast'] (ships) for the discharge of combat missions and other military duties in the course of performing their military service.... Level of military skill will be a function of the soldiers' knowledge and practical experience...."

This definition proceeds from the truth that the basic, decisive force in war has been and remains the human being. Victory in battles and engagements is achieved by those armies whose personnel not only know what they are fighting for and whose interests they are defending, but also possess high moral-political, military and psychological qualities. This means that the education given the fighting man and his instruction in the art of war are no less important than the equipment provided him, be it weaponry and fighting equipment of the most advanced kind.

The great military skill of Soviet soldiers and officers was one of the most important factors in their crushing defeat of the Hitlerite hordes in the Great Patriotic War. Millions of patriots underwent their tempering and development into true masters of the military science in the fire of battles for the motherland.

Kh. Andrukhaev, an Adyge sniper and company political instructor, was killed in fighting at Rostov in 1941. His rifle was then given to the sergeant-major, Nikolay Il'in, who then proceeded to kill 256 fascists with it. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. When Il'in in turn died the death of the brave, the rifle was passed on to Afanasiy Gordiyenko, who killed 417 more Hitlerites and also became a Hero of the

Soviet Union. Is it possible that the rifle was the key factor here? Of course not. It's simply that the human beings using it were superb marksmen. And as the old popular saying has it, "Master your weapon well and you'll overcome the enemy."

Thanks to their selflessness, iron discipline and military skill, millions of Soviet citizens who looked death in the face came out the victors and stayed alive. Among these heroes were the 33 valiant Soviet warriors who in August 1942 on the approaches to the Volga won victory over 70 enemy tanks and a battalion of his infantry. It is almost unbelievable, but it is nevertheless a fact, that this small group of Soviet fighting men led by A. Yevtifeyev, a junior political instructor, and L. Kovalev, a deputy political instructor, with only grenades, automatic weapons, Molotov cocktails and one antitank rifle, destroyed 27 German tanks and some 150 Hitlerites, while it itself emerged from this unequal battle without a single loss.

Senior Lieutenant A. Gorovtsev, fighter pilot and communist, turned in a outstanding and daring feat in fighting on the Kursk salient. He boldly attacked 20 enemy bombers and shot down nine of them. He's the only pilot in the world ever to have won such a victory in a single battle.

Suvorov's precept—fight not with numbers, rather with skill—has not lost any of its timeliness to this day. An ability to handle competently and with maximum effectiveness to employ the most complex types of modern weapons and equipment in combat constitutes the most important prerequisite for successful accomplishment of any mission. But this, of course, is not all. "Today's soldier," Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, has declared, "must not only develop thorough mastery of all methods of employing the weapons and equipment with which he has been entrusted in the most effective manner, he must also have a clear understanding of the mission of his subunit, unit or ship as well as of his own place and role in the accomplishment of this mission."

Military skill these days boils down essentially to the skill of the combat crew or team. You have only to delay unnecessarily or tolerate error on the part of one crew member or another responsible for the maintenance or operation of a unit, block or assembly for this to have an immediate effect upon the timeliness and accuracy of the rest of the troops involved, which under the conditions of modern-day warfare could entail unexpectedly serious consequences.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov points out that the task of the Soviet soldier is to learn to perform at levels such as to insure "that every bullet, shell, bomb and rocket hits its target and that the enemy is destroyed with the first round, the first missile launch, the first bomb attack. Otherwise he'll do you in. It is, in a nutshell, necessary to prepare oneself thoroughly for one's role in the defense of the motherland and to remain in a continuous state of combat readiness."

It is entirely obvious, of course, that military skill on its own isn't going to come quickly. It is achieved through painstaking effort in the course of combat, political and tactical training, through the training of troops in the field, in the air and at sea. Mastery of the science of winning has never been any simple and easy business. And now, when our inventories consist of fundamentally new types of equipment, when the fire and striking power of our armed forces has grown immeasurably and when the nature of warfare itself has undergone radical changes in nature, it is much more difficult to achieve high levels of military skill.

How greatly the level of the Soviet soldier's knowledge has now changed should not be forgotten either, however. For the fact is that almost 80 per cent of the members of our armed forces now have higher and secondary education.

This, however, is not enough in itself. Practical experience shows that success comes more quickly to those troops who strive consistently during each exercise, during each drill to reinforce the knowledge and skills they have acquired and develop a capacity for enduring any of the difficulties and trials they will encounter in actual combat.

Many years of experience have also shown that the best military specialists, the real masters of military skills, are for the most part those young men who prior to their call-up for army service have extensively and successfully involved themselves in the activities of our DOSAAF training organizations, who have taken part in the technical, military-applied sports and who have successfully passed their course of basic military training.

Our armed forces have created and are continuously improving their training equipment and facilities for the purpose of maintaining and improving military skills. Subunits, units and ships have well-equipped technical training facilities with simulators and equipment models. Commanders try in the course of their training programs to create situations requiring maximum efforts and full utilization of the combat capabilities of a weapon.

A well-organized system of disseminating technical military information is of great assistance to our troops. Our soldiers and seamen are eager to participate in the activities of speciality groups. Organized for them on a regular basis are meetings at which technical information is disseminated, reviews of technical military literature, meetings with master military specialists and exchanges of new ideas and innovations. Competitions for the title of "best military specialist" have become widely popular.

Tactical, fire and specialized training; operational readiness duties; guard and other duty details and exercises, naval cruises and combat maneuvers have all proven themselves a reliable school for all-round improvement of military skills and increasing the combat readiness of our units, ships and formations. Exercises conducted at night, in the winter cold, during the spring with its bad roads, in the summer heat and the inclement weather of fall demand of our men great physical and spiritual efforts, intelligence, steadfastness, initiative and endurance.

The Zapad-81 exercises, the largest in recent years, provided the occasion for a serious check of the strength and the state of the training of Soviet Armed Forces personnel. In this dynamic and complex situation, maximally approximating the conditions of actual combat, Soviet fighting men demonstrated their selflessness, their ability to function and employ their weapons in combat, increased political maturity and improved volitional qualities and their readiness to help provide a reliable defense of the socialist fatherland and our friends and allies and proved in deed that the high praise bestowed upon them from the platform of the 26th CPSU Congress was fully deserved.

Socialist competition is an effective means of improving military skills. It has become an integral component of the training process and has sparked valuable patriotic initiatives: "Destroy your target with the first round (first burst, first launch, first target run)"; "Fire daytime norms in night fire"; "Around the 'excellent'-rated there should be none lagging behind"; "Master all organic subunit weapons" etc.

Our young troops, among whom are a good number of DOSAAF trainees, compete for the right to launch a missile (or torpedo) or destroy a target from a tank or an infantry combat vehicle or with their own personal weapon in honor of a Hero of the Soviet Union who has served in the unit. Evaluations of these service members are entered in special record books, which are kept in combat glory museums or rooms. All this is evidence of the active outlook on life of the Soviet fighting man and of his desire to master the military profession the best he can, to become a master of military skills.

Today's complex military equipment urgently demands mastery of related specialties as well. This is necessary to maintain interchangeability within sections [otdeleniye], teams [raschet] and crews. And we're not talking about just one military specialty, but two or three.

Those who have achieved their "excellent" ratings in combat and political training are the golden treasure, the pride and glory of our armed forces. They have mastered their military skills to perfection; they are deeply conscious of their duty to the motherland; they live up to the requirements of the military oath and regulations in exemplary fashion and in all things adhere to the fundamental principles of communist morality. They will characteristically be found to have a deep sense of personal responsibility for the combat effectiveness of their subunits. Those who have undergone army training and become true masters of military skills will also, as a rule, be active builders of communism.

The whole country knows of the celebrated grain farmer Aleksandr Gitalov, twice Hero of Socialist Labor and a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, but obviously not everyone is going to know that he was also an army vehicle mechanic.

One of the country's eminent builders, Nikolay Zlobin, also a Hero of Socialist Labor, says: "For me as for everyone else who has stood in the ranks of our country's fighting men, the service was a outstanding school, a school where we acquired skills and technical knowledge, where we learned endurance and ideological steadfastness. The service years were for me a time of tempering for the rest of my life."

Thanks to the continuous concern of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, the Armed Forces of the USSR have and will always have everything they require for the task of bridling those who strive to hold mankind at the brink of war. In implementing the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, Soviet military personnel were able to salute the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR with great success in their military duty performance and continue to strive ever to be prepared to deal a decisive rebuff to any aggressor.

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## ARMED FORCES

### HELICOPTER TRAINING EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 83 p 1

[Article by Major A. Borovkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, and Cadet Ch. Loyko, Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District: "Helicopters on the Attack"]

[Text] The battle for the pass was already in its second day now. Having made a number of futile attempts to counterattack on the march, the "enemy" had now decided to bring his tanks down through the ravine under concealment and attack the strong point in the pass in the flank. Reconnaissance had spotted the nighttime movement of the group of tanks. The motorized rifle battalion commander realized that the situation was becoming critical, so through his senior commander he called for the fire-support helicopters.

A morning haze still hung over the runway of the hill-encircled air base. It seemed from the control tower that the helicopters, now ready to lift off, were having some difficulty hacking through the air, heavy still with the night's frost. Having checked the functioning of the various systems of the rotary-wing craft, the flight commander, Senior Lieutenant A. Avanesov, now scanned the skies with impatience and some apprehension. Combat under these conditions is no light-hearted affair. All the more was this the case now, what with the fact that the flight was flying with two new pilots, Lieutenants O. Vereshchenskiy and A. Gofman. They are competing between themselves. Each of them has undertaken an obligation to improve his combat skills. So for them, today's mission is going to be a serious examination.

Avanesov, however, had no worries about the leader of the second element, Senior Lieutenant V. Startsev. They had already flown a number of similar missions together in the mountains. They knew one another well and were both capable of responding coolly and carefully in difficult moments. They were known in the squadron as the "mountain kings." That's what mountain climbers call those who are expert at difficult ascents. It's also what the helicopter people call those who are skilled in mountain air combat.

Prior to their mission Avanesov and Startsev went over in detail the plan for the coming operation together with their new wingmen. This had become a rule unfailingly adhered to within the flight, this despite the fact that the sky will always make its own unalterable corrections to any plan. All the more is this true of plans like today's. For the fact is that nobody knows what other "surprises" the "enemy" is preparing. So pilots always have to have more than one variant of an operation in reserve.



Senior Lieutenant Avanesov knew that success on this mission would depend primarily upon being able to achieve surprise. And this was precisely what the wing commander was counting on most.

The course Avanesov led his machines along could have been called a risky one. Hugging the ground as closely as possible, the helicopters duplicated, as it were, all the ups and downs of the terrain below, dropping down in the depressions and then climbing up over the hilltops.

"Number 1, Number 1, this is Number 3!" — Senior Lieutenant Startsev, the leader, is giving orientation — "Targets to right on course. Reference point..., range...."

"Outstanding!" — that's the wing commander's comment on Startsev's powers of observation. Avanesov spotted the tanks emerging from the ravine and deploying in line formation. The fire from the motorized rifle troops flashed like the lights on an indicator panel. "We've made it in time," the wing commander thought, "but we're going to have to alter our plan of combat a little."

"Attack! Number 3, you begin your attack after we leave the zone!"

This method of attack demanded careful operational coordination on the part of the pilots and depended upon their ability to maintain continuous fire on their targets. It hadn't been all that long ago when Lieutenant Colonel N. Borisov, a military pilot 1st class, had analyzed a situation like this in detail in a preflight training class. It all looked so easy then, and they had all then gone out and practiced the method several times in training flights. Over level terrain, though, it's true. But now here we've got mountains. "They'll help us!" Avanesov recalled the words of a popular song. But then when he observed the assurance with which his men executed their maneuver, how accurately they were grasping his plan, he finally calmed down a little. There wasn't going to be anything to worry about now.

The combat vehicles now launched their attack. Having executed an antifiak maneuver, the helicopters launched their attack on the tanks. Appearing suddenly from behind one of the little hills, the helicopters piloted by Startsev and Vereshchenskiy opened fire. After attacking a second time, the rotary-wing machines returned unscathed back behind the hill. The "enemy" tank attack had been broken up.

Lieutenant Colonel Borisov then commended Senior Lieutenants Avanesov and Startsev and their wingmen for their skillful performance during this exercise.

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## ARMED FORCES

### INTENSIFICATION OF COMBAT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 83 p 2

[Article by Colonel General M. Khomulo, deputy commander in chief of ground forces for combat training: "On the Basis of Intensification"]

[Text] The army has recently been giving a great deal of attention to an intensification of combat training. I would like to read an article dealing with the primary directions and ways and means of intensifying combat training.

(from remarks by Senior Lieutenant V. Vdovichenko at a conference of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers)

To learn how to overcome a powerful, well-trained, well-equipped enemy has never been any simple and easy matter. But now, when the methods employed in waging armed warfare, the nature of modern-day war itself and the per-unit power available and organization and establishment have undergone such radical changes, the process of training our personnel has become even more complex. Requirements imposed on our troops in the way of tactical fire and technical training and moral-political, physical and psychological conditioning are now even more stringent. The amount of knowledge and level of skill each member of our armed forces must master within only brief periods of time have increased immeasurably. So if we were to translate Suvorov's well-known principle, "teach a soldier only a few things, but teach him those things well," which stems, now, from a time when the army's basic weapon was the rifle, into the language of present-day requirements, keeping in mind above all the fact of the complexity of our combat equipment and weaponry, the predominate component of which is the crew-served weapon, we would word it as follows: "the soldier has to be taught many things and every one of them well." All this dictates the need to search continuously for the quickest possible ways to master weapons and equipment, primarily through intensification of the training process.

What are the basic directions of an intensified combat training program?

To answer this question, let us turn to material from the 26th Party Congress. "If we were to restate this formula in practical terms," it was declared at the congress, "intensification of economic activity and improvement in its efficiency would consist primarily in insuring that production output grows faster than production costs so

that it becomes possible to produce more while at the same time consuming comparatively smaller quantities of resources."

Now as far as combat training is concerned, intensification, one of the basic aspects of which is improvement of the forms and methods of training employed, will consist primarily in striving for the best results from our military training with minimum expenditures of resources and time, for the greatest return on each minute of training time.

The payoff in terms of improved military capability for personnel of the Sevastopol' Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment imeni 60th Anniversary of the USSR is growing continuously through intensification of its training program and introduction of innovative methods and up-to-date training equipment. It maintains good organization, adheres to regulation procedures and has created an atmosphere of demandingness and responsibility for accomplishment of combat training programs and plans and fulfillment of socialist obligations. Regimental personnel are well aware that intensification will be impossible without consistent adherence to training schedules, maximum involvement of personnel in training and without uncompromising attitudes toward relaxation and oversimplification. Only by building appropriate levels of tension and stress into each drill and exercise, by creating situations in which each trainee experiences maximum stress, will we be able to achieve our objectives. Also contributing to success in this effort is extensive employment of simulator systems and equipment for monitoring the development of individual knowledge and skills. Active use of simulators has made it possible to cut substantially the periods of time required to raise the skill ratings of infantry combat vehicle drivers and gunners.

Consistent efforts to improve the effectiveness of the combat training program are to be observed in the Proskurovsko-Berlinskiy Guards Tank Regiment imeni G. I. Kotovskiy, which came out this year as the initiator of socialist competition within the ground forces. At the same time, however, as was shown in reports the regimental commander and his deputy for political affairs recently delivered at a meeting of the ground forces military council, this regiment can exploit still untapped potential for increasing the effectiveness of its combat training program. This would include, for example, increasing the intensity of the drills it conducts and making more efficient use of its training facilities and equipment.

The experience of our leading units demonstrates convincingly that success in efforts to intensify the training process depends to a decisive degree upon the quality of the training their officers receive and the extent to which it in turn is oriented, if it could be put this way, toward mastery on the part of our officers of all the new and innovative developments, particularly toward study and introduction of modern methods and training facilities and equipment.

We have recently begun to see the officer training program make increasingly extensive use of active forms of field training: group exercises, short tactical field exercises, and command-staff and tactical exercises. These give the training of our officers the greatest possible practical orientation and help develop them as quickly as possible as leaders in the training and education of their men. At the same time, however, it would be impossible not to acknowledge that these advanced forms and methods are by no means always given the proper content, one in line with the requirements of intensification and the principle "teach what you have to know in war."

It would also be incorrect to assume that the things we plan and schedule as part of the officer training program can alone solve all problems associated with the professional development of our officers and with efforts to help them develop as well a nose for the new and innovative. At this point I would like to direct attention above all to the importance to their professional development of intensive, goal-oriented, thoughtful independent work, to include study of organic weapons and equipment, innovations in methods and procedures and training facilities and equipment being introduced.

The practice of giving individual assignments to find ways to intensify the training process has also proven itself. This would be an assignment, for example, to study the effectiveness of new (modernized) models of weapons and equipment or methodological techniques involving the use of simulator equipment. Assignments like this, however, are still being given only rarely. The unfortunate fact is that officer independent study is not always properly planned, directed and monitored. The fact that there are officers in some official categories not involved in independent study programs is also a cause for concern. Unit commanders will occasionally be found beyond the range of concerns of their senior commanders.

Under way within units and subunits of the ground forces as in other services of the Armed Forces is a consistent process of improving weapons and equipment and the methods of employing them. The requirement here that new equipment must be matched by higher levels of mastery will always remain an urgent one.

The example of X regiment demonstrates what underestimation of this requirement leads to. On the occasion of some recent evaluation exercises, a number of the subunits in this unit, particularly the tank battalion commanded by Major V. Malofeyev, turned in some low scores in their tactical fire training. One of the reasons for this was poor practical and methodological preparation on the part of the commanders of a number of the subunits, the inadequacy of this preparation, that is, to the level at which the unit is equipped.

Intensification of the combat training program is inextricably linked to the adoption of an integrated approach to the training and education of personnel, to accomplishment of the tasks involved in tempering them ideologically, politically, morally, psychologically and physically and in training them in the field. This approach would presume, among other things, the integration of instruction and exercises (following, of course, completion of work at the level of training and coordinating the individual small subunits) and the subordination of all aspects of training to the interests of the tactical, when the different sections of the field training program are worked on in accordance with a unified plan and within a specific tactical context. And then in the final phases in cooperation with subunits of different branches of the service and special forces. Training and exercise programs like this also make it possible to work out problems involved in directing the operation of heterogeneous forces with their weapons and equipment thoroughly and comprehensively, achieve good coordination in staff work and effective cooperation between subunits and units of different branches of the service and, in the final analysis, to evolve a combined-arms orientation in the training of these organizations, which is of the utmost importance.

The advantages to be derived from this type of integration have been convincingly demonstrated by the experience of our leading units. On the whole, however, this question is being resolved more slowly than the situation requires. Some units have yet to purge

themselves of "blinkered" parochial attitudes, when commanders of some branches of the service and special forces are unwilling to combine efforts, while combined arms commanders fail to demonstrate the consistency and adherence to principle in these instances. To tolerate this is to forget that victory on the battlefield is achieved through the combined efforts of subunits of different branches of the service, special forces and services of the Armed Forces.

To insure the availability of up-to-date training facilities and equipment with high facility throughput levels is another effective means of intensifying the combat training program. The creation of electrified training areas in training centers and the introduction of automated systems in the operation of training facilities will substantially increase the effectiveness with which we use our training time. Locating training facilities closer to areas of deployment or, in other words, the creation of training facilities near barracks, yields benefits as well.

It should at the same time be emphasized, however, that upgrading training facilities and equipping them with the latest in training equipment will not in themselves by any means insure the success of our efforts. Situations like the following are occasionally to be observed. A unit will have simulators of the most advanced sort and programmed training equipment, but personnel training will still be conducted as it always was.

Unfortunately, we frequently encounter situations in which training grounds, tank training areas, firing ranges and artillery schools will be equipped with costly complex facilities, the effect of whose employment does not justify the resources expended on them. In striving for appearance, innovation and scale, some commanders and senior officers occasionally lose sight of the foremost consideration—the suitability, the usefulness of a facility.

We need to take cautious, judicious approaches to deciding on the construction of one new facility or another and take strict account of the specific conditions involved. Practical experience shows that allocated resources would frequently be more advantageously invested not in the construction of new facilities, but rather in the modernization or renovation of existing ones.

It is also important more fully to exploit other ways to improve our training facilities and equipment, such as, for example, development of a movement to monitor efficiency and practical introduction of proposals advanced by military innovators.

Competition is another important means of intensifying the military routine. It can be said with complete justification that competition, an integral component part of the entire process of combat and political training, is an important intensifier whose introduction, while involving no additional expenditures, can yield substantial benefits. It has been shown, for example, that exercises conducted in a spirit of competition with respect to mission accomplishment and norm achievement yield immeasurably better results. Experienced methods specialists incorporate elements of competition in outlining their plans at the very earliest stage. It is also impossible not to take into account the fact that exercises conducted this way will heighten trainee interest in a subject, helps determine the real winners and, accordingly, enhances the educative impact of the exercise experience.

These directions we have mentioned here do not, of course, exhaust the list of possible ways and means of intensifying the training process. It must be emphasized that this intensification presumes all-round improvement of the training and education programs and the utilization of all factors of high-quality training and preparation of personnel for successful accomplishment of tasks the party and people have the Armed Forces. And success here as in any undertaking will depend to a decisive degree upon organization and discipline and upon how responsibly and effectively each individual discharges the responsibilities with which he has been charged.

Creation of precisely this kind of atmosphere and the maintenance of tight training discipline, an atmosphere of creative inquiry and an orientation toward everything new and innovative in all units by through the efforts of commanders, political personnel, staffs and party organizations constitute the most important conditions for achieving greater increases in military effectiveness and, if we were to put it in terms of the most important task we have before us today, for a successful conclusion of the winter training period. The military training directorates of our districts and groups of forces, which are responsible for striving continuously to improve the forms and methods we employ in our training programs, must make their own contribution to this effort.

Requirements laid down by the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee plenum concerning improvement in style of work and increasing discipline and order set forth clear guidelines for our efforts in this area. This includes the area of intensifying the combat training process as well, where all military cadre must show better organization and responsibility, consistency, goal orientation and greater exactingness in evaluating results achieved.

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## ARMED FORCES

### ENCOUNTER WITH WARRANT OFFICER IN AFGHANISTAN DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 24 Jan 83) p 6

[Article by Colonel I. Dynin: "Such is My Duty"]

[Text] Col I. Dynin visited Afghanistan. At the request of the editors, he wrote some sketches on his meetings with warrant officers who, like the other soldiers of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, are fulfilling their international duty with honor.

The editors begin publishing them with this edition.

The squad calls Senior Warrant Officer Valeriy Kapirin an old-timer. He has served on Afghan soil for almost two years. As Valeriy himself expresses it, during this time he has "plowed many kilometers on his back." I really did not understand why he did not say on his stomach, as it is customary to say in the infantry. Anticipating my question, Kapirin explained:

"Such is my duty. The company senior technician is responsible for the condition of the combat vehicles. This is why it is frequently necessary to crawl under them on one's back."

In Afghanistan conditions are harsh not only for people, but also for equipment. There are steep rises and descents in the mountains, sharp temperature gradients, mud flows and rock slides.

"And do you know what kind of dirt they have here? Iron is pulverized like emory." Valeriy picks up several rocks from the ground and throws them at the bench in the smoking area where we are talking. "Imagine that this is a road densely strewn with rocks. You start to swing the vehicle around." He rests his open palm against a board and makes a sharp movement. "A rock falls under a cog of the front wheel, and a track can fly off."

I listened to the senior warrant officer, and my imagination depicted what seemed to me to be a realistic situation. A long column of combat

vehicles is setting out on a march. And entirely unexpectedly on a sharp turn the driver-mechanic makes a mistake, and the vehicle throws a track. The commander is in a hurry. The column must arrive at the designated point at just the right moment, but the column is stuck along the way. And the company technician hurries to help the crew.

Every driver-mechanic in the company with whom I was able to meet without fail told me about how, at his difficult moments, Senior Warrant Officer Kapirin turned up. He helped one make repairs. Another he taught how to overcome obstacles in the combat vehicle. A third was shown an oversight in time [to avoid troubles]. But I wanted to describe how he conducts himself in a difficult situation. Again the picture I had drawn in my mind of the company trapped due to a thrown track arose before my eyes. I was interested in seeing how Valeriy would act under these conditions.

"Our driver-mechanics know very well that if they drive the vehicle correctly the tracks will not fly off," Kapirin said sternly.

"But what about the rocks?"

"Even they do not bother an able driver." Valeriy whisked the rocks from the bench.

Soon after his arrival in Afghanistan, Senior Warrant Officer Kapirin set up a sort of training ground not far from the camp. He chose an area where the soil density and composition corresponded to the covering of the mountain road, strewed various size rocks about, and began to work on making turns himself. And although he had to fix torn off tracks several times, the training was not wasted. Valeriy discovered that if turns are made slowly, in several stages, rocks very rarely get under the internal track blade.

"And based on your experience, you began to work of the method of making turns with the driver-mechanics?"

"Not right away of course." I felt that Valeriy wanted to discuss his work with the young soldiers in more detail. "First I introduce them into the unit."

Senior Warrant Officer Kapirin usually meets the replacements in the field maintenance park. Before the soldiers eyes he, for example, removes the fuel filter, washes it, puts it back in place, and then requires that they repeat all these operations exactly. And this takes place every day, until Kapirin is sure that the weapons and equipment are completely mastered. Only then does he begin to teach his subordinates driving. He himself drives the combat vehicles with a certain special delight. And he values those among the driver-mechanics who have fire in their soul. That is probably why his subordinates, when they are driving, are recognized not by their call sign, but by their style.



This incident is well known throughout the regiment. During a mock battle the company was stopped by dense flanking fire, even before it reached the deployment line.

"Neutralize the emplacements," came the order to the commander of the squad at the head of the column.

And everyone watched as one of the combat vehicles, swaying as if it were a boat on the waves, went to outflank the defender's position. It seemed from afar that Driver-Mechanic Private Sergey Klimenko had started a game with the artillerymen: first he sharply increased speed, then suddenly braked, but stubbornly moved ahead. The gunner of the combat vehicle laid down constant fire on detected positions. The fire was especially effective at the moment that Klimenko, having overcome numerous obstacles, was able to come out almost at the rear of the ambush. First the guns of the enemy fell silent; soon even the machinegun fire died out. The company made it to the designated line on time. And Private S. Klimenko, for his courage and great skill displayed in a situation close to the conditions of modern warfare, was awarded the medal "For Valor." And one of the first who congratulated the soldier with all his heart was Valeriy Kapirin.

Thus step-by-step, one fact at a time, the image of the company senior technician was filled in. The only thing that remained unfinished was the conversation with which our acquaintance began. Returning to him, I became interested in how long it took a crew to put a track back on. He did not answer immediately, and was not definite. He said that it depends on the terrain. If a vehicle is squeezed in between rocks or is hanging over a precipice so that it is even difficult to get to it, then it takes a long time.

"And the crew's training plays a tremendous role," he added. "In exercises we have reduced the established norm by half."

"Well, what about on a march or in an attack?" I specify. "No doubt both more effort and time are required?"

"Evidently more," Kapirin answered uncertainly.

"So, have you had any such moments?" I elicit.

"No, there have been none," Valeriy shook his head. "In our company, the tracks have never come off on a single combat vehicle either during an attack or when marching."

The picture which I had painted in my mind melted away, as if it were a snowball in a warm river. For an instant, something akin to disappointment stirred in my heart. It was as though the senior warrant officer had let me down. He had intriguingly begun a conversation about the sharp turns on the Afghan roads, and then at the end serenely stated that in his company there had been no problems due to the tracks. My gaze fell on Valeriy's hands. Large, weatherbeaten, with broken nails and fresh and old scars,

they lay motionless on his knees. And I could not help but think that were it not for the calluses and scratches on these truly golden hands of the senior technician, the company would have had problems from thrown tracks.

The company commander told me that Senior Warrant Officer Valeriy Vladimirovich Kapirin had been awarded the Order of the Red Star for courage and great skill displayed at a number of training exercises. True, he had worn it only once, immediately after he received it. All the rest of the time the senior technician spent in working overalls. Such is his duty.

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ARMED FORCES

COMPLAINT RESULTS IN OFFICER'S TRANSFER TO RESERVES

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 24 Jan 83) p 23

[Unsigned article: "And People Are Complaining"]

[Text] The report of Yu. Konorov was published under this heading in the July issue of this journal. It concerned the crudity of officer N. Protashchuk displayed toward warrant officers subordinate to him and his disregard of the requirements of regulations.

As Colonel V. Bobin, deputy chief of the Political Administration of Military Construction Units, reported to the editors, the facts were confirmed and the critical report was discussed in the units' political department. The command and the political department had a meeting with the commanders, political workers, and also the warrant officers, at which questions raised in the report were considered.

The state of military discipline in the unit, and questions of improving political and educational work with the personnel were discussed at a party meeting.

For crudity toward subordinates and in creation of an unhealthy situation in a military collective, officer N. Protashchuk had party and disciplinary proceedings instituted against him. It was decided to transfer him to the reserves.

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## ARMED FORCES

### HAND TO HAND COMBAT TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 24 Jan 83) p 24

[Unsigned article: "Learn to Win in Hand-to-Hand Combat"]

[Text] Experience at the front shows convincingly that hand-to-hand combat is an effective means of conducting the concluding phase of close combat (in trenches, lines of communications, fortifications populated areas and mountains). Victory in hand-to-hand combat depends entirely on the psychological stability of the soldier and his strength and dexterity.

Soldiers acquire these moral and combat qualities, and specific techniques and methods of combat with the enemy in physical training exercises. Obviously, the level of training will be higher to the extent that sergeants and warrant officers master advanced methodology for conducting such exercises. In response to the desire of this group of servicemen, the journal's editors are beginning with this issue a series of articles on the methodology for conducting exercises in hand-to-hand combat, with and without weapons. Hopefully this advice will also help all servicemen who read the journal to independently master the techniques of hand-to-hand combat, and strengthen their feelings of moral and physical superiority over the enemy.

The Department of Physical Training and Sports of the Main Administration of Ground Forces Combat Training is in charge of the section "Learn to Win in Hand-to-Hand Combat."

First of all we will acquaint sergeants and warrant officers with the general methodology for training in techniques of hand-to-hand combat (see diagram).

The experience of leading commanders confirms that if a leader adheres in his lessons to the sequence shown in the diagram, he will most effectively teach his subordinates the techniques of hand-to-hand combat.

At the first lesson, the commander works out such training questions as stance, movement, and self-protection. We will discuss in more detail the methodology for learning individual elements of the most difficult of the preliminary techniques—self-protection during falls.

## Diagram of the Methodology for Teaching Techniques

<u>Familiarization</u>	<u>Methods of Learning</u>	<u>Training</u>
Name the technique;	As a whole;	Perform the exercises;
demonstrate it;	in parts or segments;	in an uncomplicated environment;
explain the circumstances under which the technique is used;	with the aid of preliminary exercises	after additional activities involving significant physical stress;
demonstrate in slow motion or in segments and explain how the technique is performed.		in combination with other activities;
		under conditions of limited visibility, and in individual protective equipment.




Figure 1. Backward fall from low frontal stance.  
 Figure 2. Sideward fall from medium frontal stance with body turn.  
 Figure 3. Self-protection in falling forward.

**BACKWARDS FALL (Figure 1).** From a low frontal stance, squatting deeply, tuck you legs under you body, and, rolling over on your back, cushion the impact by spreading your arms slightly to the side. This alignment is maintained in the final position: the chin is clasped to the chest, arms are on the ground with palms down at an angle of 40-50 degrees from the body, legs are bent, thighs are pressed to the body, and knees are slightly apart.

SIDEWARDS FALL (Figure 2). From a medium frontal stance, squatting and simultaneously turning the upper part of the body to the right (left), roll over in this alignment on your right (left) side, averting falling to the ground by straightening the right (left) arm and also the legs. This alignment is maintained in the final position when falling on the left side: the left leg is bent and is on the ground; the knee is close to the chest; the right leg is bent at the knee joint; the entire bottom of the foot is on the ground; the left palm is touching the ground 15-25 centimeters from the knee; the right arm is extended upward and forward; the head is pressed to the right shoulder.

FORWARD FALL (Figure 3). From a high frontal stance, fall forward with arms slightly bent and apart at the elbows. Gently lower the body to the ground. When jumping forward, to soften the impact roll with arms bent at the elbows consecutively on the chest, stomach and thighs.

Preliminary exercises for accomplishing this technique consist of doing three or four rolls--chest-stomach-thighs--first from a prone position then from the knees, and finally from the high frontal stance.

BASIC COMMANDS given in learning preliminary techniques include: "Low (medium, high) frontal stance--MOVE!;" "Left side stance--MOVE!;" "Position of alignment--MOVE!;" "Fall to the left (right) side--BEGIN!;" "Backwards fall--BEGIN!;" "Forward somersault--BEGIN!;" "Exercise at your own speed--BEGIN!;" "Exercise--HALT!"

Teaching soldiers the preliminary techniques takes place in a single rank formation (for a squad) opened two or three paces, or in two ranks (for a platoon) facing each other at a distance of six to eight paces.

In the future preliminary techniques must be included in each lesson on hand-to-hand combat.

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## ARMED FORCES

### RULES FOR JOB RELATED COURSES GIVEN

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 24 Jan 83) p 30

[Article by Colonel P. Shcherbina: "For Improving Official Qualifications"]

[Text] Beginning with this issue, the journal will regularly publish, under the rubric "School of Legal Knowledge," materials by military lawyers, and specialists of personnel, rear services and finance elements, on the experience of legal information services in sub-units and units.

Below at the reader's request is discussed the procedure for training warrant officers [Praporshchiki, Michmani] and extended service personnel at evening and correspondence higher and intermediate specialized civilian educational institutions, and information about the benefits they are granted.

Warrant officers and extended service personnel may study at evening and correspondence higher and intermediate specialized civilian educational institutions in subject areas related to their military specialty, or enabling them to increase their military and specialized knowledge in the field in which they work. Servicemen not having higher education and who are recommended are authorized to enter training. Those who require knowledge of a foreign language due to their branch of service, irrespective of their duties, military specialties and prior education, may study in evening and correspondence civilian higher educational institutions (faculties) of foreign languages.

Persons desiring schooling apply through the chain of command, naming the educational institution and faculty (department), no later than 1 December of the year preceding the year of enrollment.

Senior commanders authorize attendance at VUZes by warrant officers, based on the request of large-unit and unit commanders. Large-unit and primary warship commanders, their equivalents and superiors authorize attendance by extended service personnel, based on the request of unit commanders. Commanders of military units authorized to accept personnel for service as

warrant officers and extended service personnel authorize study at evening and correspondence intermediate specialized civilian educational institutions by all categories of personnel.

Those who have received authorization to study submit their application to the educational institutions in the established format. Prior applicants who did not pass entrance examinations or were not accepted for study can again be authorized to apply, but no more than twice. Military personnel entering the indicated educational institutions or already enrolled are sent to take exams and tests and do laboratory work only upon receipt of a personnel summons from the educational institution.

Those who have been authorized to take entrance exams may be granted additional leave without pay: for higher educational institutions--15 days; for secondary--10 days, excluding travel time to and from the educational institution.

Successful students are granted additional leave with pay. To do laboratory work, take tests and exams, students in the first and second years of evening higher educational institutions may take 20 calendar days; those in evening secondary specialized educational institutions--10 calendar days; and those in higher and secondary specialized correspondence educational institutions--30 calendar days annually. Students in the third and subsequent years are granted for these purposes 30 calendar days at evening higher educational institutions; 20 days at evening secondary specialized educational institutions; and 40 calendar days annually at correspondence higher and secondary specialized educational institutions. An additional 30 calendar days leave is provided to take state exams.

For the ten school months prior to starting work in the graduation project (thesis) or taking the state exams, students are allowed one free day per week to prepare, and are paid 50 percent of their pay. At their discretion, unit commanders may grant an additional one or two days without pay per week from duties during this period.

Upon the recommendation of the appropriate educational institutions, unit commanders may grant students in their final years at evening and correspondence higher and secondary specialized educational institutions an additional month of leave without pay.

Commanders and staff officers who have authorized schooling may also prohibit it if the servicemen do not fulfill their duties or display lack of discipline.

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## ARMED FORCES

### IMPORTANCE OF ENGINEER TRAINING STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 83 p 1

[Article: "Engineer Training of the Troops"]

[Text] The battalion commanded by Maj L. Vorob'yev carried out a training battle in the mountains while acting independently of the main forces. The absence of a sufficiently developed network of roads, massive damage and landslides, mixed minefields and other obstacles placed by the enemy had made the execution of the mission considerably more difficult. This, however, did not deter the soldiers from achieving success. Thanks to their high level of engineer training, their skilful utilization of engineering methods and their efficient cooperation with the combat engineers attached to the battalion, they prevented the enemy from seizing a tactically advantageous line.

Yes, practice does show that the training a unit receives in carrying out combat operations as required at any time of day or in any season under complex geographical and climatic conditions is, in many respects, determined by the skill of the personnel in all arms of service to carry out independently engineer support missions which do not require special expertise or engineering equipment. The improvement of the skills necessary to do this--skills possessed by the soldiers of various specialties--is an important direction in the work of the commanders, political organs and headquarters.

As experience indicates, success in this matter is achieved there, where, in the organization of the training, engineer training is not separated from tactics and the combat engineer support missions are executed in every exercise without simplification and without indulgence.

One motorized rifle regiment in particular, led by Maj Engr-Serv Ye. Velichko (of the Red Banner Far East Military District), acts in this manner. Here, together with the thorough development of engineer training according to the elements of programmed questions, the tasks of combat engineer support are resolved in each field exercise in conjunction with tactical training. In an environment that simulates the combat environment to the maximum degree possible, the unit personnel from the various arms of service included in the regiment learn to erect the simplest structures for observing and directing fire. They likewise learn to overcome minefields and nonexplosive obstacles, to lay out routes for columns, to cross water obstacles using available and authorized equipment, to construct field defenses,

to camouflage occupied areas and positions and to execute other engineering missions. It is quite natural that, in the course of tactical lessons and exercises, the regiment's personnel demonstrate the skill to carry out engineering measures in all types of combat.

Each unit possesses extensive possibilities for improving the personnel's engineer training. Such possibilities, unfortunately, are far from being everywhere employed. Some commanders approach this issue in a simple manner, farming it out to specialists in the engineering field. Engineering measures which would facilitate combat operations are often carried out beforehand in the training areas, and an excessive interest in theoretical questions is allowed. As a result of this, the most complex practical problems remain unworked. Similar deficiencies occur, in particular, in certain units of the Carpathian and Belorussian Military Districts. These cannot be reconciled with. Commanders, headquarters officers and specialists in the engineer services must persist in making sure that questions of engineer support are thoroughly worked out in all tactical lessons and exercises, as modern warfare demands. In doing so, it is important that they make creative use of the very rich front-line experience, as well as the experience from major exercises such as "Zapad-81," for example.

With the increase in the scope and the pace of combat and the number of missions that the units have to carry out independently of the main forces, the role of the engineer training of company- and battalion-level officers is likewise increased. For this reason, it is important that engineer support missions under various types of combat be practically executed by the officers in lessons in the commanders' training system, in field exercises with the personnel and in special tactical exercises. In additions, it is also important that these officers learn to use organic and attached engineer units and engineer equipment. Each combined-arms commander must be familiar with engineering matters to the degree that he could organize reliable engineer support for the troops subordinate to him in any form of combat without the assistance of specialists. At the center of the officers' attention should be those questions associated with the methods of organizing and carrying out lessons in engineer training.

Profound changes in the nature of combat likewise make their mark upon unit training among the engineer troops. The personnel in combat-engineer, road-construction, river-crossing and assault, engineer-works and other units must learn to resolve engineering problems in a united tactical situation, in close cooperation with units of the other arms of service. We must decisively eliminate the practice in which special tactical training is carried out without consideration of the combined-arms nature of modern warfare.

Further improvement in the troops' engineer training is inseparably linked to an increase in the effectiveness of competition. It is necessary to utilize more fully the mobilizing force of competition in the campaign for the quality solution to each combat-exercise problem and to more actively introduce the experience of the leaders. The methods of organizing competition in training and field exercises with regard to the tasks and standards of engineer training must be taught to the commanders, political workers and headquarters officers in a more concrete fashion.

An important segment of the work of party and Komsomol organizations is the campaign to raise the level of engineer training among the personnel of all arms of service.

Using methods which are inherent to them, they are called upon to make sure that each soldier has a profound understanding of the value of engineering in modern warfare, that he knows how to employ this engineering, that he consciously and responsibly carries out all the tasks set before him and that he displays creativeness and initiative.

Making maximum use of the time remaining until the end of the winter training cycle for further improving the troops' engineer training means raising their combat readiness even higher.

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## ARMED FORCES

### REGULATIONS GOVERNING WOMEN IN ARMED FORCES OUTLINED

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 5, Mar 83 p 35

/Article under rubric "We Answer the Letters of Readers": "Women in Military Uniform"/

/Text/ Unmarried, childless women 19 to 40 years of age, physically fit for military service and having no lower than an eighth-grade education, may be accepted on a volunteer basis for active military service as soldiers, seamen, non-commissioned officers and petty officers. They are accepted for 2, 4 or 6 years. Upon completion of this term, service may be extended, according to their desires, for any of the stated periods.

Women up to 30 years of age, who have graduated from higher educational institutions and received training in military departments, as well as those who have graduated from higher educational institutions in civilian specialties related to the military, may voluntarily enter military service in officer positions, and they are given officer ranks. Women up to 30 years of age, who have a higher or secondary specialized education related to corresponding military specialties, may voluntarily enter military service in the capacity of warrant officers.

Women who have voluntarily entered military service are assigned to positions on the basis of their area of specialization and general educational level. Those accepted in positions as soldiers, seamen, non-commissioned officers and petty officers are given appropriate rank, depending upon the position filled. Promotion for service, increase in rank, is granted on the basis of their political, occupational and moral qualities. The next higher military ranks are conferred upon completion of a fixed period of satisfactory service, given favorable recommendations, in accordance with the rank prescribed by the authorized table. Those having entered military service enjoy the rights and responsibilities, the material and pension security, the monetary allowances, the entitlements, and the privileges and preferences prescribed for reenlisted military personnel and the members of their families. They have, also, the right to enroll in evening general educational secondary schools, and in correspondence and evening higher and secondary specialized educational institutions.

Women serving as officers or warrant officers, and the members of their families, enjoy the material and pension security, monetary allowance, rights, privileges and preferences established, respectively, for officers and warrant officers.

In the event of childbirth, female military personnel are granted the leave of absence established by effective legislation for care of the baby, and are paid appropriate allowances.

Those wishing to enter military service must contact the rayon military commissariats for their place of residence, or the headquarters and administration (departments) of personnel of the military okrugs.

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## ARMED FORCES

### BOOK ON INTERNATIONALIST QUALITY OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES REVIEWED

Moscow POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 2, 1983 (signed to press 21 Jan 83) pp 70-74

[Book Review by Colonel V. Kazarinov, RSFSR honored cultural worker, of the book "Army of Friendship of Peoples and Proletarian Internationalism," by N.I. Matyushkin, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982]

[Text] As CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized in his report, "Sixty Years of the USSR," our armed forces have always been a good school of internationalism. This book being offered to the reader traces the role of the friendship of our country's peoples and of the international education of Soviet soldiers in strengthening the combat might of the USSR Armed Forces at all stages of the history of the world's first workers' and peasants' state.

From the beginning of its existence our army, the book emphasizes, has been structured as a single, multinational army. Already by the end of the civil war, soldiers of approximately 50 nationalities served in its ranks (p 19).

The book notes that the internationalism of the Red Army has been clearly displayed since its establishment in the composition of its commanders. Thus, shoulder to shoulder with the Russian military leaders Budenny, Voroshilov, Shaposhnikov, Kamenev, and Yegorov, there fought for the socialist homeland the Ukrainians Antonov-Ovseyenko, Parkhomenko, Shchors, and Bozhenko; the Latvians Vatsetis and Fabritisius; the Moldavian Kotovskiy; the Georgian Kikvidze; the Kazakh Amangel'dy Imanov; the Kalmyk Gorodovikov; the Chechen Aslambek Sheripov; the Dagestan Ulubi Buynakskiy, and representatives of many other nationalities.

Ukrainian, Belorussian, Latvian, Estonian, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Bashkir, Tatar and other national military formations operated in the ranks of the Red Army. They were created under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and local party organs. The republic Revolutionary Military Council realized operational control over their staffing in accordance with instructions of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) [RCP(B)] of May 1919. There was a special department in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army [WPRA] Political Administration which conducted educational work in the national units.

The national formations played a positive role in the battle against counterrevolution and military intervention. They brought together the Red Army and the indigenous population of national areas and facilitated increasing their authority within the mass of population and strengthening their combat power.

The author accentuates attention on the fact that the Red Army soldiers of various nationalities fought for land of other peoples with the very same tenacity and selflessness as for their own land. For them there was not "their own" and "foreign" land, "their own" and a "foreign" homeland, there was a single Soviet land, a single Soviet Homeland.

The book notes that representatives of the workers of other countries also fought bravely for Soviet power in the Red Army ranks--Hungarians, Poles, Serbs, Croats, Czechs, Germans, Chinese, Koreans, Romanians, Bulgarians and other foreign brothers of the Russian workers and peasants--approximately 250,000 internationalist soldiers. Five international divisions, 3 international brigades, 55 international regiments, 40 international battalions and 46 detachments and other sub-units were formed on the territory of Soviet Russia (p 37).

The formation of the USSR had exceptional importance for strengthening internationalist origins in the Red Army. The author writes that it signified the beginning of a new stage in the development of our armed forces and created favorable conditions for further strengthening the defense capability of the socialist fatherland. Common territory, a single union citizenship, and a single system of state management of military structuring made it possible to merge and best use for defense and country's material and human resources, and to involve all workers without distinction as to nationality and race in building socialism and strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet State. Military schools were created in national areas for training command cadres of non-Russian nationalities, in implementation of the instructions of the 12th Party Congress. Measures were taken to include more representatives of these nationalities in the ranks of the Red Army. From 1 October 1922 to 1 October 1925 they increased from 21.3 to 38.8 percent of overall personnel strength (p 48).

The ever-growing danger of a new world war and the threat of aggression against the Soviet Union on the one hand, and improving the technical equipping of the Red Army on the other required systematic improvement in personnel training and further strengthening of centralization in military leadership. Territorial national formations could not fully satisfy these requirements. Therefore, in March 1938 the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) [AUCP(B)] Central Committee and the USSR Council of People's Commissars [CPC] adopted a resolution on the transformation of national units, large units, military schools and WPRA schools to an all-union basis with extraterritorial staffing. The 18th Party Congress approved this resolution.

Strengthening internationalist origins in the Soviet Armed Forces was inseparably linked with ideological and political education of military personnel. The book shows how popularizing among the troops the idea of friendship of peoples had tremendous importance in shaping the moral and political make-up of Red Army soldiers. Guided by instructions of the Party Central Committee, the political organs and army party organizations explained the essence of Leninist national policy, propagandized equality and brotherhood of peoples, demonstrated the success of joint efforts by the working masses of various nationalities in building socialism, and in so doing helped strengthen international unity under army conditions.

During the process of educating soldiers in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and friendship of peoples, great attention was paid to revealing the antipopular activity of vourgeoise nationalists and deviant nationalists. All this heightened the soldiers' political vigilance and taught implacability toward any manifestation of national dissension, alienation, or attempts to set one nation against another.

Explaining to the soldiers the great advantages of the socialist over the bourgeois system was of great importance in the ideological and political work of army and navy party organizations during the pre-war period. Illuminating successes in the struggle for socialism, the political workers told of the grievous situation of peoples in the capitalist countries and the colonial and dependent countries suffering under the imperialist yoke. Against this background the fundamental opposition of the two politics--socialist and imperialist--on the national question was manifested still more sharply. This strengthened still more in the soldiers' consciousness a feeling of pride in their socialist homeland and their multinational, single Fatherland--the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The great Patriotic War was a severe test of the strength and effectiveness of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. The author remarks that only an army cemented by the solid friendship of the peoples represented within it, and inspired by the noble aims of the struggle, is capable of an unprecedented accomplishment such as that which the USSR armed forces achieved in the years of war against Hitlerite Germany. The incomparable combat qualities of Soviet soldiers, and the supreme strength of communist ideology with which the Soviet Army and the entire Soviet people were armed, were manifested in the invincible determination which they displayed during the period of defensive battles, and in the victorious offensive operations against the Hitlerite hordes. The enemy suffered a military, economic, political and ideological defeat. The communist ideology of equality and friendship of peoples gained complete victory over the fascist ideology of racism and misanthropy.

The sons of all the nations of the Soviet Union were among the valiant Soviet troops which broke the enemy's backbone and crushed him in his own lair. Heroism for the glory of the homeland and for the sake of its freedom and independence was idisplayed by representatives of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. The national composition cited in the book,



of soldiers who earned the high award, Hero of the Soviet Union, and were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, is a convincing conformation of this fact (p 58).

The author writes that during the period of the Great Patriotic War the friendship of the USSR peoples and Soviet patriotism were especially clearly manifested. Several documents are reprinted in the book whose authors are people from various republics and various nationalities. And at the same time these are people with the same convictions, with an identical great feeling of duty toward their Soviet homeland, an identical fervent love for their fatherland, an unbending, ineradicable hatred toward its enemies, and an identical understanding of the vital necessity of friendly cooperation among peoples.

A Russian soldier, Junior Political Commissar Yu. Kaz'min wrote his mother:

"Mama, do not turn the war-spotted pages of ancient books, or go to old man Arkhip Naydenov. Do not seek with him some sacred miracle in our amazing deeds. Listen to me: We are winning because we are fighting not only for our life. In battle we think of the life of an Uzbek boy, a Georgian woman, an old Russian man. We go to the field of battle to defend the holy of holies--our homeland. When I pronounce this word I want to kneel" (p 59).

Loyalty to the friendship and brotherhood of the USSR peoples resounds appealingly in a collective soldiers' letter to A.A. Zhdanov, secretary of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) and the Leningrad Party Obkom and Gorkom, written by the Tajik Odinayev, the Buryat Khakayev, Tatars Naturmanov and Baybikov, Uzbeks Mirzayev and Dauletov, and Kazakhs Biguzhinov and Tiksyarov:

"We came to the Leningrad front from various oblasts, krays, and republics of the Union. Our fathers, mothers and children gave us a strict order: wherever we may fight, on whatever front we may destroy fascists--fight the enemy as if for your own home, fight fiercely and mercilessly.

"We know that if we defend Leningrad, we will live well in Siberia; if we defeat the fascists at Leningrad, the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Tatars and Chuvash will not be slaves. All the peoples of the Soviet Union now have but one thought, one desire--to save the homeland and smash the Hitlerites. Our friendship has become still stronger in battles, and friendship tempered in the fire of battle is a great and terrible force" (p 72).

The monolithic unity of the Soviet Army, the book emphasizes, stems in large part from the work of the Communist Party in educating soldiers, especially those of non-Russian nationality. The Central Committee directed the special attention of the political organs and army party organizations to the importance of this work. A special directive of the Main Political Administration, published at the instructions of the AUCP(B) Central Committee on 17 September 1942 entitled "On Educational Work With Red Army Troops and Junior Commanders of Non-Russian Nationality," brought to light the experience and revealed the shortcomings of this work, and gave instructions on how to improve it.

The position of instructor for working with soldiers of non-Russian nationality was introduced in the political organs of fronts and armies. At the end of 1942, the AUCP(B) Central Committee sent 260 party activists from the national republics to the front as agitators. For the same purpose the Cadres Administration, WRPA Main Political Directorate [MPD] sent 2429 people to troop units. Soldiers of non-Russian nationality were trained as political workers at special departments of military-political schools and at political staff courses.

From October 1942 through February 1943 alone, the MPD published 75 leaflets with an overall circulation of 3,370,000 copies and 31 brochures with a circulation of 350,000 to 630,000 copies each in the languages of the USSR peoples. By 25 January 1943 the fronts had received 80,000 copies of political literature and fiction written in the languages of the USSR peoples. In 1944 the fronts' political directorates published 47 newspapers in the languages of the USSR peoples, including 11 in Uzbek, 10 in Kazakh, 9 in Tatar, 4 in Armenian, 4 in Azerbaijani and 3 in Georgian.

In late July through early August 1943 a gathering was held, organized by the MPD, WRPA, of Red Army front and okrug agitators working with soldiers of non-Russian nationalities. The participation in this gathering of M.I. Kalinin, AUCP(B) Central Committee Secretary A. S. Shcherbakov, and prominent party propagandists D.Z. Manuil'skiy and Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy gave this event special importance (pp 77-79).

Developing internationalist consciousness and strengthening fraternal friendship among soldiers of different nationalities also helps strengthen combat effectiveness and combat readiness in the USSR armed forces under present day conditions. Su Marshal D.F. Ustinov, minister of defense and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo notes:

"Under conditions of developed socialism, new opportunities are opened up for further strengthening the international cohesion of military collectives and for strengthening the wholesome educational influence of military service. The intense, purposeful actions involved in mastering complex, predominantly collective military equipment and weapons, using them under conditions approaching those of combat, and overcoming the significant moral-psychological and physical burdens of military service all contribute to inculcating in soldiers feelings of brotherhood and friendship, military cohesion, and a desire for mutual assistance and cooperation" (p 164).

Among the forms and methods of internationalist education of soldiers which have proven themselves are lectures, reports, discussions, and visual methods of agitation which reveal the essence of Leninist national policy and show the flourishing of socialist nations.

For example, on the submarine where Captain 3d Rank V. Uchayev is deputy commander for political affairs, days of the Soviet republics have become an effective way of propagandizing the Soviet way of life. Their program includes transmitting a special radio news program and publishing military

leaflets about a given republic, with illustrations selected from journals and newspaper clippings telling about life in the union republics, and thematic evening gatherings with speakers especially from among those sailors who lived in the given republic (p 140).

The book notes that one of the elements of educating personnel in internationalism is teaching Russian to soldiers of non-Russian nationalities. Party regulations on this matter are stipulated by one of the fundamental requirements of its national policy, that of granting complete freedom for each USSR citizen to speak and teach his children in any language. At the same time the Russian language has become, in fact, the language of international intercourse and cooperation of all the Soviet people. Mastering Russian is especially important under army conditions, where it is otherwise not possible to fully master weapons and equipment, or the finer points of military science.

Of course, political organs and army and navy political organizations also consider the national particularities of soldiers and sailors in their activities, and conduct many events in their native language. This permits the tasks of military service to be explained in more depth, and soldiers to be more quickly included in the life of army and navy collectives.

Fraternal ties among soldiers and officers of armies of Warsaw Pact member states are being strengthened. Cooperation among the armies of socialist countries, the author writes, is a natural phenomenon and a powerful source of their strength. A continuous and beneficial link has been established among them. Soviet soldiers systematically visit units of the fraternal armies, share their experiences and study the experiences of their friends. In turn, soldiers of the fraternal armies are just as frequently the guests of Soviet soldiers. They also pass on their experience and discuss successes of military and political training.

Cooperation of fraternal armies is also taking place in party-political work. In particular, political sections of fraternal army large units [divisions, separate brigades] jointly conduct seminars on problems of the internationalist education of soldiers. Along with theoretical questions, these seminars examine new forms of work which are locally initiated, adjust plans, and work out recommendations for organizing visual agitation efforts, employing technical propaganda means, etc.

Joint training of fraternal armies, during which mutual understanding and friendship of the soldiers is strengthened, plays an important role in the internationalist education of personnel. This training strengthens ties among peoples and armies, and between military organs and local authorities.

This book by N.I. Matyushkin is written at a rather high ideological-theoretical level and contains a great deal of factual material. It would, undoubtedly, benefit from greater attention to, and a correspondingly expanded discussion of, the present internationalist education of Soviet soldiers. I also would have liked the book to have more clearly and

thoroughly shown how the new level of international relations in our country under conditions of developed socialism has reflected on the activities of the USSR Armed Forces. Occasionally one finds repetition and platitudes in the book. Nevertheless, it seems to me that this book will be useful to lecturers, speakers, propagandists, students in the party training system, and persons studying the history of the USSR and its armed forces, and problems of the Soviet way of life.

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## ARMED FORCES

### BATH HOUSE CONSTRUCTION DRAWS CRITICISM

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 83 p 2

[Reply to reader's letter by Maj A. Borovkov: "Behind the Clouds of Bath House Steam"]

[Text] Soviet Army servicewoman Tat'yana Mikhaylovna Vershinina, who wrote an alarming letter to the editorial staff, has been working at a motor-vehicle equipment depot for two years. According to references provided by her superior, Maj Vladimir Sedegov, her work has been good and she copes with her duties. If a hitch is noticed in the work somewhere, she never refrains from helping. Obviously, this is a person who really cares about her work.

Her letter to the editorial staff testifies to this fact.

"If you would look at our depot area," wrote T. Vershinina, "you would be offended and upset, as I was. Much of the equipment that has been shipped to us lies on the ground, out in the open."

We then took a walk with Vladimir Ivanovich Sedegov through the depot area. It really was an unsightly picture. There were boxes of equipment and spare parts everywhere. Many pieces had been disassembled, and the headlights and glass were missing on some of the new vehicles.

"In the first place, we do not have the space," said Sedegov, shaking his head in distress. "In the second place, we do not have the manpower."

The storage facility which T. Vershinina manages is intended for tank and truck tarpaulins and covers. What goes on here, however, only approximates "storage." It looked as if many of the tarps, frozen together and covered with snow, would never be used for what they were intended. All summer long, Tat'yana Mikhaylovna asked daily that people be assigned to repair the storage facility, but things are just as they were.

Maj Sedegov said that the situation could be explained by the fact that the unit was not at full strength, that there was a shortage of construction materials and that there were other objective difficulties. According to the words of Sedegov, the depot chief had put the question of the situation taking shape to higher headquarters a number of times, but this had not helped matters. This is not even counting the fact that construction has begun on new storage facilities, the completion of which is still not in sight.

Here is the interesting part, however. As it turns out, construction is under way at the depot under these same difficult conditions. A new facility--a bath house--was turned over quite recently. It is the second one here. It has a spacious steam room, swimming pool and banquet hall.

One might ask: What about the first bath house? Did it break down? Nothing of the sort. Indeed, it was built a little more than a year ago. Moreover, Maj Sedegov feels that the steam room in the old bath house holds the steam better. Why, he even thinks that it is a better-looking bath house. In fact, he took an active part in the construction of both facilities. As you can see, the construction materials and the manpower for this were found.

One also must say that, in contrast to the depot, everything in the bath house is in complete order: the walls and ceiling are of high quality and the brooms, tubs and mops are precisely arranged.

"When I leave here," said the depot chief with pride, "the bath houses will remain. The people will thank me for this."

Yes, it is difficult to overestimate the value of a bath house, particularly in the severe conditions found in the Transbaykal region. How nice it is, at the end of the work week, to come in to a nicely heated room when you are chilled to the bone from the biting winter wind, take off your clothes and climb up onto one of the shelves in the steam room! How the cold water in the pool invigorates you after the steam room!

This is the way things are. Only a few manage to experience similar pleasures at the depot. As T. Vershinina writes, access to the bath house and the swimming pool is restricted. Priority is given to visiting representatives of higher departments. Is this the reason why up until now the question of the mess at the depot has not been put forth with the necessary urgency, and why the bath house steam reduces the visual acuity of some inspectors?

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## ARMED FORCES

### BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MARSHAL SU M. N. TUKHACHEVSKIY

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 83 p 6

[Article by Army Gen V. Varennikov: "On the 90th Anniversary of the Birth of Mar SU M. N. Tukhachevskiy: Military Leader"]

[Text] One of the prominent places among the famed cohort of outstanding military figures whom the Great October Revolution separated from the popular masses belongs to Mar SU Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevskiy.

Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevskiy was born in Dorogobuzhskiy uyezd, Smolensk guberniya on 16 February 1893. As a young second lieutenant he participated in World War I fighting, was captured and tried to escape four times. The fifth attempt proved successful. On returning to Russia, where the Revolution already was raging, he took the side of the working people without hesitation.

In April 1918 Tukhachevskiy began service in the Red Army in the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] military department and joined the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], dedicating his life to the cause of defending the Land of Soviets.

The counterrevolutionary mutiny of the Czechoslovak corps in May 1918, provoked by Entente imperialists, created enormous danger in the eastern part of the Soviet Republic. The party Central Committee declared the Eastern Front the main front and sent prominent party and soviet workers and party members with a military education there, including M. N. Tukhachevskiy. He was appointed commander of 1st Army. At that time he was 25 years old.

Thanks to boldness and decisiveness of maneuver, speed of movement and skillfully organized coordination among the divisions, the 1st Army under Tukhachevskiy's command liberated Simbirsk and then, fighting its way 800 km in 50 days from the Povolzhye to the Urals, it liberated nine cities from the White Guards and White Czechoslovaks independently and liberated three together with other armies of the front.

Tukhachevskiy's military leadership talent unfolded especially vividly during his command of the 5th Army of the Eastern Front, in fighting against Kolchak. The operation plan drawn up and implemented in a talented manner by Tukhachevskiy, his exceptionally bold but thoroughly weighed decisions and the swift,

vigorous actions of the troops he led allowed achieving a fundamental turning point in the course of combat actions and supported the liberation of the Urals and Western Siberia. Vladimir Il'ich Lenin pointed out that under Tukhachevskiy's leadership the 5th Army "in a single year turned from a small group into an army with a strong revolutionary passion, united in the victorious fighting in defense of the Volga and in the defeat of Kolchak's detachments..."

Clearly realizing the features of the Civil War, the vastness of fronts, the oftentimes small size of our armies and special conditions for manning them, he would find methods and forms of accomplishing combat missions appropriate to a specific situation.

The party sent Tukhachevskiy where a difficult situation would be forming. While commanding armies and fronts he actively participated in defeating groupings of Whites which had penetrated to Voronezh, Krasnov's White Cossack Army on the Don, and remnants of Denikin's army in the North Caucasus, and in repulsing the attack by troops of bourgeois-landowner Poland. On Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's instructions Tukhachevskiy was assigned the leadership in putting down the counterrevolutionary Kronshtadt rebellion and then eliminating the Antonov affair--the kulak-socialist revolutionary activity in the center of the country.

Tukhachevskiy's military talent reflected common traits of the new type of army's military leaders born of the Revolution: a high party spirit, a class approach to matters of military affairs, knowledge of the laws of social development and consideration of them in war, an ability to estimate political, economic and other factors leading to victory correctly, reliance on the masses and a close tie with the people (soldiers and commanders loved Tukhachevskiy and trusted in him despite his youth). At the same time his own leadership feature could be clearly perceived in the operations he conducted: originality of concept, activeness and surprise of attack, military daring, intelligent risk, an attempt to conduct a struggle in terms of maneuver, and an ability, relying on past experience, to find the proper solution to today's tasks and seeing tomorrow's problems without falling prisoner to old experience.

At the end of the Civil War Tukhachevskiy gave of his energy and knowledge to the further strengthening and development of the Red Army. While commanding the Leningrad and Volga military districts and then holding the position of deputy chief and chief of staff of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army], chief of armaments of the RKKA, and deputy and first deputy people's commissar of defense, Tukhachevskiy performed extensive organizational work to carry out plans outlined by the party for reinforcing national defense and for reorganization and technical outfitting of the Soviet Armed Forces. He elaborated very important defense matters and took a direct part in preparing and implementing military reform. Under his leadership the foundations were laid for creating new branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms, above all the air force, air defense forces, motorized and mechanized troops and airborne troops. He also made a contribution toward developing a concept for setting up a contemporary Navy.



Based on an estimate of a future war as a war of motors and a war of equipment, he posed the question of the most rapid development of aviation, tanks, artillery and automatic weapons and was the initiator of the transition to a new organizational structure of units [soyedineniye and chast'], showing himself as an innovator of military affairs.

Tukhachevskiy deserves great credit as a major military theorist. His studies of the nature of a future war are of permanent importance. Many of his basic works are devoted to this matter, including "Novyye voprosy voyny" [New Issues of War], "Strategiya natsional'naya i klassovaya" [National and Class Strategy], "Voyna kak problema vooruzhennoy bor'by" [War as a Problem of Armed Struggle] and others.

He cautioned that war can begin suddenly, that old ideas about methods of deploying troops and conducting border engagements no longer correspond to the capabilities of new combat means, and that an aggressor may attempt to disrupt planned mobilization in areas adjoining the border.

Of special importance were propositions advanced by Tukhachevskiy about the initial period of war. "The first period of war," he emphasized, "must be correctly foreseen back in peacetime, it must be correctly estimated back in peacetime and it is necessary to prepare correctly for it." His ideas that by virtue of the great power, speed and range of modern means of destruction they permit hitting the enemy to the entire depth of his disposition simultaneously later became the basis of the deep operation theory which played an important role in the Great Patriotic War.

Tukhachevskiy attempted to test his theoretical views in exercises and games. He showed constant concern for developing military-scientific work in the Armed Forces, he was one of the initiators in creating the "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia] and later was the editor, and took a direct part in preparing the three-volume work "Grazhdanskaya voyna 1918--1921 gg." [Civil War of 1918-1921]. He wrote a total of 120 works.

Tukhachevskiy played an important part in the indoctrination and training of military cadres. After becoming chief of the RKKA Military Academy, Tukhachevskiy reorganized training there in a half-year's time in conformity with practical needs of the Red Army. He placed primary emphasis on the vitality of training and development in students of independence and the ability to apply knowledge in practice.

No matter where Tukhachevskiy worked or what posts he held, he always was a communist and Leninist, approached any matter with high party exactingness and responsibility, and burned with an unquenchable fire of initiative and with the desire to be of as much benefit as possible to our Army and our people. At the same time, as his combat friends recall, he always remained a simple, accessible person, behaved modestly and was cordial, affable and sociable.

Tukhachevskiy was awarded the Order of Lenin, Order of Red Banner and a revolutionary honor weapon. In November 1935 he was among the very first in the Red Army to be awarded the high title of marshal of the Soviet Union.

Tukhachevskiy's life was broken off tragically before the Great Patriotic War, but his ideas and his tireless work played a significant role in the defeat of fascist armies. Even today a number of theses advanced by Tukhachevskiy, especially on matters of control and the influence of new means of warfare on troop organization, on forms and methods of warfare and on the methodology of combat and operational training, have not lost interest. They help make fuller use of the very rich experience of the past in strengthening the defense and military might of the Soviet Union.

Years go by and generations change but the memory of such remarkable people as was military leader and party member M. N. Tukhachevskiy will always live in the hearts of thankful descendants. We recall with great gratitude the names of the selfless fighters who defended the great achievements of October and the first socialist state in the world under party direction and the leadership of Lenin in the difficult struggle against our Motherland's enemies. The organizational forms of the new type of army became established in those menacing years, the foundations of Soviet military science and military art were laid down and the combat traditions of our Armed Forces were born.

In the process of their development the Soviet Army and Navy acquire new moral-political and combat qualities. This improves their capabilities and reinforces their combat might. At the same time we know well, and history bears witness to it, that it is always necessary to display high political vigilance. We cannot permit falling behind; we need constant technical modernization of the Armed Forces, the development and introduction of new organizational forms, and a creative search and mastery of more advisable methods of their strategic and tactical employment. This requires exceptionally strenuous creative work and great foresight in military organizational development and the development of military science and creation of modern control systems on the part of command, political and military-political cadres and staffs, and all personnel.

No less difficult defense tasks arise for the Soviet state in the new historical situation, under conditions of the sharp increase in aggressiveness in the politics of imperialism and an activation of its military preparations. In directing attention to their importance CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said in his speech at the Extraordinary November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum: "We know well that we can't beg for peace from the imperialists. It has to be defended only by relying on the indomitable might of the Soviet Armed Forces."

Guided by party instructions the USSR Armed Forces are persistently improving their combat readiness and are standing vigilantly on guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the great achievements of socialism.

## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### QUICK REACTION EXERCISE IN AD MISSILE UNIT

#### Modern Combat Conditions

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jan 83 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Avn P. Khatylev, deputy commander for combat training of Order of Lenin Moscow ADD: "The Commander and Modern Combat: Under Conditions of a Rigid Time Limit"]

[Text] Personnel of the surface-to-air missile [SAM] subunit commanded by Capt N. Konov repeatedly showed high results in tactical exercises. No one had any doubt that the subunit also would be equal to the occasion in performing range firing, but the hopes were not borne out. Hardly had the missilemen launched against a low-altitude air target when there was a failure of automatic tracking. It was necessary to take urgent steps to reacquire the target, but here guidance officer Sr Lt S. Karas' made a crude miscalculation. Capt Konov also did not function in the best manner in this suddenly complicated situation where success was decided by seconds.

An analysis showed that the mistakes in the actions of Capt Konov and many of the team specialists were a result of oversimplifications permitted in organizing the specialists' combat training. I will stipulate right off that these oversimplifications cannot be categorized as apparent and striking. At first glance the subunit had done much to improve the quality of practicing training tasks and norms. In drills and practical classes the officers strived to diversify the situation and make it complicated and instructive for the trainees. It is not every diversification of conditions of combat work produces the necessary effect, but only those which create the most probable situations in actual combat and accustom personnel to act confidently under conditions of a rigid time limit. This was the deciding circumstance which the subunit commander did not take into consideration.

Let's say the missilemen were learning to destroy air targets in practices both at high and at extremely low altitudes and they were operating in a situation similar to that which formed in performing operational training launches at the range. But how was this concept implemented in practice? The operators' screens usually abounded in blips from simulated air targets, but ground clutter was absent. The missilemen were performing practice launches under conditions of a time deficit, but without interceptors taking off, and consequently they were not experiencing the effects of jamming, terrain conditions and so on. It stands to reason that it is easier and simpler to get high grades this way. This is what created an atmosphere of false well-being in the subunit.

Why did this become possible? The fact is that both Capt Konov and other subunit officers realize well the harm of oversimplification in combat training. The whole problem is that their methods training did not fully meet the demands being placed on the organizers and directors of combat training. They lacked ability and the experience to create those conditions in practices and problems which would approximate combat reality to the maximum.

It is a well-known requirement to teach personnel combat actions against a complicated tactical background under conditions of a rigid time limit, but what specific conditions meet these requirements? Just what kind must they be in the process of training different categories of servicemen and how should the specialists' class ratings and their period of service be taken into account? It stands to reason that the commanders have good knowledge of the starting provisions and demands which determine organization of the training process. They unquestionably give the commanders room for imagination and initiative. But it is also obvious that in organizing a problem or practice in each specific case the commander proceeds above all from his own experience and personal impression of the nature and features of modern combat. There are instances where what is in the class instructor's opinion a complicated and instructive situation that is being created turns out on inspection to be only remotely resembling what it could shape up to be in actual combat.

That is how it was with Capt Konov as well. This was the circumstance which was telling when unit staff officers evaluated the personnel's training during the period of inspections as well. It stands to reason that the inspectors directed attention to certain deficiencies in combat training and helped remedy them, but they believed on the whole its organization met the demands of modern combat.

Effectiveness of the training process and its approximation to actual combat reality thus depends to a large extent on officers' methods training and their depth of knowledge of the air enemy's operating tactics. The officer gains the knowledge and skills he needs by the method of independent work and in classes in the command training system. Just how was such training organized in the subunit in question? A check showed that all officers have independent work plans, and scheduled classes were conducted here. There was thus complete order on paper, but the return was not very high. It turns out that many classes were held by the lecture method and they were insufficiently directed toward improving officers' methods training. The experience of the best officer-methods specialists also was poorly propagandized here.

Life requires unit commanders and staffs to show more objective concern for the methods store of subunit commanders. High results are achieved where this task is accomplished thoughtfully, creatively and with initiative. We will mention the unit commanded by Lt Col Ye. Petrov. Primary emphasis here in organizing officer command training was placed on the use of active training forms: thematic classes as short training problems, seminars in tactical and special training, and work on the equipment and at the command post. Conditions are created in any class so that officers are not only students, but also its live participants and so that each training situation came from life and prompted them to think imaginatively and seek and find optimum solutions.

Command training here is arranged in a differentiated manner: Many classes are held individually with launch platoon commanders, missile guidance officers, radiotechnical battery commanders and so on. Careful consideration is given to their experience, time in the position and professional training, which permits making training more objective and useful. This has a noticeable effect on an increase in the officers' methods proficiency.

A similar approach to organizing officer training is typical of many units and subunits. What is noteworthy is that usually there is no oversimplification here and the personnel's results in combat training are high and stable.

More than once I have had occasion to hear good words about subunit commander Officer V. Romantsov and the proficiency of his subordinates, who already have made it a tradition to accomplish difficult training missions with an outstanding grade. Then came new information that the missilemen distinguished themselves in performing operational training launches at the range. They had to function in a very difficult scenario abounding in rare and one could say extreme situations.

For example, from an umpire's narrative problem the subunit was left without target designations at the most important moment. Scopes were "swamped" with intense electronic countermeasures and according to the narrative the main communications channels were disrupted. But there was a small, high-speed target in the air and success in mission accomplishment was decided literally by seconds. The commander found a solution in this extremely difficult situation and managed to make maximum use of the equipment's tactical capabilities.

It is hardly necessary to mention that Officer Romantsov is an experienced methods specialist and a capable organizer for combat. During drills the missilemen repeatedly practiced techniques of combat work in situations similar to those which arose at the range and so what happened did not catch them unawares.

Other foremost subunits and units also are distinguished by perfected training and teamwork. It is typical that officers' command training is well arranged in them. The experience of training young officers and those who recently were appointed to a new position merits particular attention. The essence of the matter is that initially the immediate superiors act as instructors for a practice drawn up with consideration of the knowledge, schooling and skills of the officer trainees. Later this same variant is run through again, but this time a trainee acts as instructor. This is repeated until the officer fully masters all techniques of tactical control.

I would like to emphasize in particular that automation of the control process is of inestimable assistance to the commander under conditions of today's fast-moving combat and rigid time limits. Realizing this thoroughly, foremost commanders persistently improve their personal professional training, develop firm skills in the effective use of means of automation in combat and give unremitting attention to the selection and special training of teams.

A majority of units and subunits now have a very good training facility allowing the creation of a situation of practically any complexity for classes and

practices. Nevertheless some commanders still do not make full use of the capabilities of simulators, trainers and other training gear.

When one is present at tactical exercises and drills with such commanders, it is always surprising how smoothly and evenly combat work goes. The people apparently all are working to their utmost, there is an excess of air targets and narrative problems are given often, but one does not sense the real intensity or breath of actual combat. It seems that not one narrative problem will be unexpected, forcing the concentration of will and expertise of the trainees. But if you complicate the situation, for example, by a narrative problem suggested by the entire course of development of events, then immediately the smooth rhythm of combat work is interrupted.

That happened in particular in a night drill in a subunit of Unit "X." The subunit was working a training mission confidently and various complications were simulated, including the failure of the radar antenna system, but this caused no particular difficulty for anyone. But it was only necessary to give a narrative problem about an actual antenna replacement when hitches immediately began. This incident became an object lesson for unit officers.

Speaking at a meeting of the party aktiv of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov remarked that the threat of war and threat of aggression on the part of imperialist countries is a stern reality of our days. This demands that we have doubled, tripled vigilance and steady daily work to improve the combat might and combat readiness of our Armed Forces. Combat training and the personnel's mastery of the art of conducting modern combat has a very important role to play in maintaining the units' high combat readiness.

Experience confirms that if a commander has a detailed knowledge of the nature of modern combat and masters all techniques of control in combat he can count on success in a fight against a strong, crafty, maneuvering, technically equipped air enemy.

#### Command Post Activities During Exercise

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jan 83 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col N. Kalmykov: "Report from Command Post of Surface-to-Air Missile Unit 'X': On the Far Lines"]

[Text] One after the other the doors of the command post [CP] leading to the hut cramped with electronics and other pieces of equipment slammed shut silently. From here the surface-to-air missile [SAM] regiment was being placed in readiness to conduct combat actions. Equipped with various technical means, the CP resembled complicated machinery set in motion, continuously regulating the numerous tactical control parameters. Information on the air and ground situation is concentrated here, it is continuously analyzed, decisions are made and missilemen's actions are coordinated from here. Now, with preparations under way to repulse an air "enemy" attack, the main room of the CP--the tactical control hut--is in semidarkness. Only the large,

wall-size plotting board gives off a weak, dull light and the display scopes and lights for illumination at the specialists' work stations flicker like dim, varicolored fires.

Gds Capt A. Makarov is directing the CP team's actions. The duties of CP operations duty officer which he is performing are special duties. They presume not only an ability to place equipment and people in readiness to repulse an air attack in compressed time periods, but also an ability to control combat confidently and the capability if necessary to assume all responsibility for its outcome.

Informed in general terms about the concept of the drill, I knew that Gds Capt Makarov this time would have to direct the regimental CP's actions independently enormously longer than usually happens in such cases. The commander and chief of staff would join in the operational training work only at the height of a dense raid of air targets. Makarov would have to make decisions for the first missile "launches." Of course he didn't know this. How would he cope with the mission?

The first impression about the officer was absolute imperturbability and even a certain sluggishness. By the way, there were no grounds for nervousness. Everything was going strictly according to one of the formats which had been tested repeatedly. Then Pfc Yu. Shelekhov plotted a fix at the very upper edge of the air situation board. A high-speed, high altitude aircraft was in the air, and there immediately came an almost physical sensation of the swiftness of time, measured by tens, hundreds of kilometers swiftly reducing the distance to the target. There still are no reports about readiness of missiles for launch, but his composure as before does not let Gds Capt Makarov down. He is concentrated and inwardly composed. A quick glance at the board, at the electronic clock, at the display scope where a miniscule blip is pulsating, and again at the board. "Operations work at the CP is one of the most complicated forms of military activity for the missilemen," unit chief of staff Gds Maj A. Mal'kov said prior to the drill. "An officer performing the duties of CP operations duty officer must have all moral-volitional qualities developed to perfection and honed to the limit. But this is not enough. He has to be an expert in organizing combat work, and a psychologist and analyst. He has to be able to think for the enemy, divine his plans and anticipate his actions. This is not given to everyone. Much depends here on abilities. Makarov has such abilities and he is one of the best CP specialists."

I recalled these words automatically when the CP team already was performing vigorous actions to repulse the air raid. Hardly had reports on readiness to open fire sounded in the dynamic loudspeaker when a command came immediately from the CP and in almost that same instant came a report about the launch of missiles. And in a very brief time period came a report about "destruction" of the aircraft.

Then new targets were in the coverage and the display scopes were becoming brighter from the blips and jamming popping up. Now loudspeaker communications did not abate for an instant: report-command, command-report... There were only instants for reflection.

Gds Capt Makarov now does not resemble at all that sluggish officer which he was at first. He is impetuous and quick, his reaction is instantaneous. It is as if he absorbs and passes through himself, through his nerves and heart, everything occurring around him in the air and on the ground.

The raid continues. It is massive, from different directions. More and more targets descend to extremely low altitude and press to the earth, and the time from their detection to opening of fire is measured in very small time periods. It is not simply necessary to destroy the targets, it has to be done without fail before the moment they strike a defended object and the battalions' positions.

Only now the regimental commander and chief of staff join in the tactical work. Combat continues with even greater intensity. From that moment there are only brief, fragmentary entries in my notebook about it:

Commander: "I confirm the decision on Target 44."

Reports: "New group target." "18th is maneuvering."

Commander: "Immediately shift fire to 18th."

Commander: "For seventh--do not destroy 56th. Step up work against 52d. Next..."

Report: "18th destroyed. Expenditure two."

Commander: "Received. Next target--22d."

Command from senior commander: "Reduce missile expenditure."

Later I would learn what caused the last command: Density of the raid exceeded the tactical capabilities of the unit's subunits. The accuracy of missile launches had to be improved to the maximum. In this situation only this variant gave a chance of success, and missilemen of the foremost regiment did not let this chance slip by. All targets were destroyed conditionally at the far lines.

When the CP doors opened the blinding whiteness of the snow struck the eyes. Trees and bushes stood in silence and the fields around froze in a quiet hush. I had the thought: What strain and what labor of the people to whom protection of the sky has been entrusted this peace and quiet costs!

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## DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

### LECTURE ON NAVAL ASSAULT LANDING CRAFT

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYE in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 9 Nov 82) p 27

[Article by Captain 1st Rank S. Litvinov: "Assault Landing Craft"]

[Text] Among the numerous classes of combat ships, our assault landing ships are perhaps the newest in our navy. Suffice it to say that at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Navy had not a single assault landing ship which had been specially designed for the purpose.\* What were referred to as "elpidiphores", flat-bottomed coasting vessels with displacements of 500-1200 tons which the Black Sea Fleet employed during World War I, are considered the predecessors of today's assault landing ships. "Elpidiphores" (this word meant "bearer of hope" in Greek) had been transporting watermelons, tobacco and grain on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov for many years. A distinctive characteristic of theirs was a virtually zero forward draft, which made it possible for them to dispense with any moorage; they were able to approach the shore directly and even run up several meters onto a sandy beach. Some ingenious Russian naval officer noticed this, and our navy suddenly had a fleet of ready-made landing ships which were excellent for their day. Each "elpidiphore" could take on up to 1000 assault troops and 1000-1300 tons of cargo. These ships were armed with a single 75mm gun or two to four 47mm or 37mm guns. "Elpidiphores" were employed successfully in Russian naval assault operations on the Black Sea.

Amphibious assault landings were particularly extensively employed during the Great Patriotic War. Our navy carried out 113 landing operations. The largest and most important of them were the Kerch-Feodosiya operation (December 25, 1941-January 2, 1942), when 42,000 men, 198 guns, 43 tanks and much other equipment were landed on the shores of the Crimea, and the legendary landing in the vicinity of Novorossiysk at the celebrated Malaya zemlya. "The landing at Malaya zemlya and the battle for it can stand as a model of the military art," L. I. Brezhnev, a participant in this unparalleled operation as chief of the political department of the 18th Amphibious Army, which played a most active role in the decisive engagements here, wrote in his book "Malaya zemlya."

Because our navy had no landing ships built especially for that purpose, it employed a variety of combat ships to transport troops and land them on the beaches, even to the extent of using cruisers (as in the assault landing operation at Feodosiya), torpedo

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\* Our country had only a general-purpose landing barge, that is, a small, flat-bottomed nonself-propelled craft having light draft.

and patrol boats, motor boats, fishing seiners and other auxiliary craft and floating equipment. Historians have calculated that over the course of the war our navy landed troops in an operation on one scale or another an average of every 10 days.

The modern naval assault landing ships our Navy now has are represented by large, medium and small landing ships as well as landing boats. Distinctively characteristic of the architecture of all landing ships is the fact that the superstructure, upper deck accommodations and engines are located aft, while the rest of the hull is given over to space for landing troops. Also common to all these ships, moreover, is a low forward draft, which permits them safe approach to a shoreline, even one without landing stages, piers or moorages. All landing ships are seaworthy enough and capable of speeds sufficient to permit them (depending upon displacement and type of ship) to transport naval infantry varying distances. The bow of all naval landing ships has a special opening mechanism, a unique door and hatch through which assault combat equipment comes off down ramps something like gangplanks either directly onto a beach or into the water for independent movement from ship to shore.

In external appearance, the large landing ships (abbreviated BDK [LLS]) would remind one of multistory buildings, each floor of which is designated for a specific purpose. Electronic equipment aboard the LLS permits continuous underway surveillance of underwater and air situations making it possible to detect an enemy at great distances. The navigation room is equipped with all necessary instruments, with the aid of which the ship is capable of passages under any conditions (in fog, at night, amid large concentrations of ships within a limited landing area etc.). Its power plant (engines, electrical equipment and fire-protection, fuel and other systems) and substantial fuel and water-carrying capacities make the LLS capable of passages of several days under any weather conditions. The armament with which the LLS is equipped provides reliable protection against enemy underwater and air attack. Assault troops are accommodated in quarters provided for them. All naval infantry combat equipment is self-propelled, that is, it can approach and board a ship under its own power. Large landing ships take tanks, APC's and multiple rocket launchers onto their decks. Rapid-fire assault antiaircraft mounted on the upper deck add to the ship's air defense capability.

Medium landing ships (SDK) [MLS] differ substantially from the LLS with respect to external appearance. They have smooth, elegant hull contours. The MLS's great speed makes it capable of rapid transport and high maneuverability near shore in the vicinity of a landing area. The ship's multiple rocket artillery give it a reliable capability of destroying the greatest variety of coastal targets as it approaches a landing point. All assault combat equipment is accommodated in the hold and reliably protected right up until it is discharged onto the shore.

The small landing ships (MDK) [SLS] look like long, rectangular boxes with a small superstructure rising aft, from where the ship is controlled both underway and during assault landing operations. Combat equipment is also accommodated in a hold in the hull of the SLS and is discharged from the ship via a special ramp, which at the same time serves as a unique stem. Use of the SLS is limited by an operational radius fixed for it as well as by its inherent seaworthiness. These small ships confidently perform the tasks characteristic of them, the tasks of transporting and landing assault troops.

Entirely new capabilities for landing assault troops became available to the navy with the appearance of air-cushion ships and boats. The idea of creating a vehicle capable

of moving at unprecedented speeds while supported by a cushion of compressed air was first advanced by K. E. Tsiolkovskiy. A capability of lifting a craft moving on the surface of the water made it possible to eliminate its resistance to the hull and thereby substantially to increase the speed of the ship, now flying, as it were, over the waves on a cushion of air. Air continuously forced under the bottom of the hull creates what is referred to as an air cushion, which then holds the ship above the water as it moves.

It is worth pointing out here that the world's first air-cushion craft underwent its sea trials in our country as early as 1934. This was the L-1, a two-seat boat created by the engineer V. Levkov. In 1936 another one of his boats, the L-5, which had a duralumin hull, reached a test speed of 131.04 km/h (72.8 knots). It was fitted with aircraft engines with horizontally mounted propellers which created a cushion of air under the hull. There subsequently appeared the improved L-9, L-10 and L-11 models (the L-10 had six engines). Tests continued until 1941, but when the war broke out all work was stopped.

In outward appearance the KVP, as air-cushion ships and boats are referred to for short, looks like an aircraft with depressed wings. Below the hull, where the waterline usually runs, is a rubber collector, a sort of black rubber "skirt." Mounted aft are large rudders and aircraft-type propellers. On the upper deck, in addition to these but nearer the stem, is the superstructure with smooth rounded ends. Here are located the KVP's pilot house and control center. Mounted at the sides forward of the superstructure are two twin-mount rapid-fire guns. As is true of any other combat ship, the KVP carries its own electronic equipment, radar station and radio communication equipment. The inside of the pilot house looks a lot like the cockpit of one of today's airliners. Just as does the airliner pilot, the KVP commander controls his ship himself by means of a steering wheel. To his right is a chair for the commander B-U [expansion unknown]. In front of him is a control console with many dials, switches, indicators and lights. Some switch on the engines, others change their operating mode, still others are for control. Controlling a KVP is a difficult thing, what with the fact that it really does travel with the speed of an aircraft. The engineer's movements underway, particularly at the beginning of a passage, remind you somehow of those of a pianist, his fingers continuously moving rapidly from one switch to another. Everything inside the KVP looks like a regular landing ship. Naval infantry troops are accommodated in special assault force quarters with their combat equipment, including their tanks, carried in a hold. For the KVP crew there are cabins for the officers and warrant officers and compartments for the seamen.

Time passes quickly during a sea passage. Not, figuratively speaking, during a "passage", but rather during a flight, for it's really hard even to know whether the ship is running over the surface of the water or gliding through the air. The propellers howl loudly, while the roar of the air cushion compressed under the vessel never ceases. The KVP fears no shallows or mine fields. It flies effortlessly and elegantly over the waves. When it approaches a shoreline it doesn't slow down, but rather races over the shore and then on in over land. Here it cuts its engine speed and drops instantly onto some meadow landing. The assault troops immediately jump out, their tanks crawling out down the ramp. The landing force moves into action. The KVP's mission has been accomplished.

There are a great number of landing ships in our navy's inventory, ships whose fame has spread throughout all the fleets; they are famous throughout the country as well,

and students in today's DOSAAF naval schools dream of serving aboard them. There are the large landing ship "Krasnaya Presnyaya", which participated in the "Zapad-81" exercises, a great number of medium landing ships and then the pride of the Soviet shipbuilding industry—the air-cushion landing ships.

So thanks to the continuous concern the party and government have demonstrated for strengthening the defensive capability of the Soviet state, the golden hands of our designers, engineers and workers have been able to create outstanding combat ships, on which it is both an important responsibility and an honor to serve.

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## DOSAAB AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

### LACK OF SPARE PARTS NOTED

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 23 Mar 83 p 3

[Article by I. Khodun, on-the-job drivers training supervisor, DOSAAF consolidated technical school, Simferopol': "Where Do We Get Help?, Letter to the Editors"]

[Text] DOSAAF's Simferopol' model consolidated technical school has good traditions. It trains no small number of highly skilled specialists for the Armed Forces and the national economy each year, these including machine operators and drivers in all categories. The school disposes of over fifty vehicles.

Here's the problem. To refuel them you have to wait for hours at a city gas station. The garage doesn't have its own gas pump, although it could get one put in if it wanted to. It's also hard to understand why we have a tank truck—just to stand there and rust?

Things are also in bad shape when it comes to our vehicle repairs. Our vehicles are officially part of the equipment, if we can use the term, allowance of the Simferopol' motor vehicle maintenance and service center. If you send a vehicle in for repairs you have to send the spare parts in with it and lay them right in the "paws" of those trusty crack mechanics. Otherwise you're not going to get your vehicle repaired on time.

We turn out some three hundred motorcyclists a year here. Over the course of the program our machines will develop problems, but it's hard to get them repaired because there aren't any spare parts. To sell them by means of noncash transaction is prohibited.

I think the time's finally come to solve the spare parts supply problem.

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## MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

### DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES OF MILITARY INSTRUCTORS DETAILED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 83 p 1

[Article: "The Military Instructor in the School"]

[Text] I finished school 10 years ago, but I frequently recall my teachers, particularly Boris Vasil'yevich Makarov. He was a front-line soldier and bearer of military medals, and he managed to find an approach with each of us. With a great deal of interest and enthusiasm, we outfitted the basic training office, built a shooting range, worked in hobby groups and took hikes. Boris Vasil'yevich knew how to talk about the officer's profession in such a way that all of our eyes lit up. In many respects, thanks to him, several hundred graduates of our school--an entire battalion of officer cadets--chose this very profession."

It is not difficult to guess that these lines are about the school's military instructor. Lt Col (Ret) Boris Makarov works in Balashikha Secondary School No. 15. Capt B. Yanyshv wrote to the editorial board about him.

There are many such letters in the editorial board's mail. Soldiers and sailors, officers and cadets in military schools write about military instructors with warmth and gratitude. Most often, the letters are about those who have been working at the school for many years and who have found a calling to teaching and educational work with the students of schools, vocational and technical schools. Many military instructors joined the ranks of the pedagogical collective in 1968 after basic military training was stipulated for young students by the USSR law entitled "On General Military Service." Time has convinced us: military science in general education, professional technical institutes and technical schools have noticeably increased the effectiveness of the young patriots' education and have become an integral part of the training for defense of the motherland and for service in the army and navy which the younger generation receives.

The circle of the military instructor's everyday duties is extensive and varied. The military instructor's love for military affairs and his profound knowledge must be combined with a knowledge of pedagogical methods, teaching skills and the ability to find the key to a young person's heart. It is no accident that the majority of individuals among the thousands who comprise the detachment of military instructors in our schools are reserve and retired officers--people who have a great deal of experience in life and are prepared to devote all their efforts to educating the generation now growing up. Held in esteem among these are the participants of the

Great Patriotic War, people who know the real value of military labor and feats of arms. For the young people, their word is particularly ponderable and authoritative. They use their personal example to teach their pupils an active and vital position and the skill to defend their convictions steadfastly. They likewise teach them diligence, modesty and sincere generosity.

Lt Col (Res) Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich Teleshev has been working for 12 years as a military instructor at Secondary School No. 82 in Minsk. The children love him, and the teachers value and respect him. Teleshev went to the front in 1941. He was a bright and courageous radio operator, one of the first in the regiment to be awarded the Medal of Valor. Later, the Order of the Red Star shone on his chest. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union after the crossing of the Dnepr, when he and his comrades in arms not only ran a telephone cable across the river, but also displayed fearlessness in repelling the enemy's fierce counterattacks. This soldier was given the Gold Star by M. I. Kalinin in the Kremlin. For the young boys and girls, to see and hear this hero is their good fortune, an event which will leave a mark on their souls for long years to come. The hero comes to school here every day, conducts classes and teaches military affairs and courage like a pedagog who has found a lofty goal and good fortune in school and in his work with the children.

The school military instructor is involved in many matters. All the concerns of the educational institution affect him as they do any teacher. The main thing for which he is responsible is the the military training of the students and the complete and high-quality fulfilment of the requirements of the educational program. It is important that he prepare the youth for army service not only in the moral but the practical sense as well, having equipped them with the corresponding skills. Here not only teaching skills are required of the military instructor but also the skill to convince fellow teachers of the importance of his subject, to establish the necessary training objectives for the lessons and to be guided by the assistance of the military registration and enlistment office and the units and training centers which look after the school.

From year to year, the graduates of the Uchaly Secondary School in the Bashkir ASSR achieve high indicators in basic military training. This is primarily because the school's military instructor, Hero of the Soviet Union Maj (Ret) Zh. Sunagatullin, has the proper concern for the material support of the lessons and for the degree to which they approximate the reality of the army situation. The school's upper-classmen always await field instruction with interest. During the course of this training they live in tents, make short forced marches, shoot combat weapons, develop courses of action for the soldier on the offensive and the defensive and learn to carry out the unit's internal administrative affairs as stipulated by regulations for combined arms elements. All of this, in conjunction with the physical and drill exercises, helps the young people to sense the rhythm of army life and to adjust to it.

One of the military instructor's most important duties is the military-patriotic education of the young men and women. Naturally, such is the duty of all the teachers. Therefore, the military instructor always has many assistants. Besides, his practical advice and recommendations are needed by many. Only collective labor and combined efforts will insure an integrated approach to educating the young patriots and make it possible to get to the heart and consciousness of each young man and woman and to help them absorb the glorious revolutionary, combat and labor tra-

ditions of the older generation. There are the teachings of Lenin, lessons in courage, "Days of the Heroes," "Combat Colors Holidays," discussions of military-patriotic films and books, debates, trips to historic places, meetings with veterans, "Memorial Shifts" and military sport games such as "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok." It is already difficult today to name just the most important forms of work in the military-patriotic education of the students. Indeed, thanks to the active, creative search of the military instructors, this arsenal began to fill out particularly rapidly right after the introduction of basic military training for students. It is also difficult to overestimate their contribution to the creation of school museums.

Maj (Res) I. Yashchenko wrote the editorial board: "Capt (Res) M. Novikov of the Timashevsk Secondary School in the Tatar ASSR very skilfully and interestingly supplements the planned basic military training classes with extracurricular work." Further on, the writer told of how the students of this school made trips to heroic cities and visited places where their countrymen fought heroically against the enemy. In this school, they have composition and drawing contests on heroic themes and competition for the best performances of ceremonial and front-line songs. All of this leaves a profound impression in the children's education. This military instructor has received high marks from the motherland for his tireless work. The Order of the October Revolution shines on the chest of this front-line soldier alongside the two Orders of Glory and the other military awards.

The military instructor must keep sight of cultivating among the young men discipline, physical endurance and a smart appearance during drills. He must also keep sight of the work of mass-defense groups and the various military-patriotic student associations--clubs and schools. He must first of all concern himself with making it possible for the students to visit military units, ships, and military schools and become acquainted with combat arms and equipment and the life style of the soldiers.

There are few measures with which the military instructor is not involved in the most direct way. No matter with what enthusiasm the military instructor takes up his work, no matter how much spirit he puts into each undertaking, he cannot achieve success without the active support of the school's leaders and the entire pedagogical collective and without relying upon the party and Komsomol organizations, the Pioneers and the young members of DOSAAF. It is the same here, too--experience convinces us that it is difficult for the military instructor to create within the school the material base necessary for mastering the basic military training program without the assistance of local public-education agencies, the military comisariat, the DOSAAF raykom and the units' commanders and the political workers.

Unfortunately, it is precisely the poor educational-material base that more and more often has a telling effect upon the quality of basic military training in many schools, professional and technical institutions and technical centers. Practical classes here are frequently replaced with theoretical. Meanwhile, the methodological training of the military instructors has not everywhere been put right.

The tasks and the nature of the daily activity of the military instructor in the school, like those of any pedagog, require from him the constant improvement of his ideological-political, military and pedagogical level and his methodological skills. To constantly teach oneself while teaching others must be the motto of those military instructors who have been working in the schools for many years and of those who will teach military affairs to teenagers after completing pedagogical institutions.



The calling of the military instructor is honorable and noble. Let each of them be successful in carrying out tasks of state importance and in educating future soldiers--the defenders of our socialist fatherland.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### COMMENTARY ON U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 8 Dec 82)  
pp 24-25

/Article by A. Ivanov: "The Pentagon's Barbarous Weapons"

/Text/ No to chemical weapons! Ban chemical weapons! Ban barbarian weapons! Such appeals can frequently be seen on the pages of newspapers in various countries and on the banners in the ranks of participants in demonstrations. The peace loving public is protesting against the unrestrained arms race being implemented in the United States, especially since the Reagan administration came to power. Whipping up military hysteria to the utmost, threatening those not subject to their dictates, brandishing weapons, the U.S. imperialists are openly preparing to unleash nuclear war. In these criminal designs they are counting primarily on the huge nuclear arsenal of the Pentagon. At the same time, the Pentagon has adopted a new, extensive program for improving offensive chemical weapons.

These weapons have been called inhuman and barbarous since ancient times. They may be employed over large areas, both in combat zones and in the rear. Most vulnerable will be the civilian population, which is unprotected with respect to chemical weapons. According to specialists, population casualties from chemical weapons may be 20-30 times higher than troop casualties. The aggressor is counting on destroying people, while preserving and using in his own interests industrial enterprises, residential buildings, roads, bridges and other material assets. The American militarists with characteristic cynicism have, over the course of many decades, persistently emphasized this feature of chemical weapons as the most important argument supposedly proving the need for their improvement and use.

After the destruction of Hitler's Germany, the United States took on the role of leader in developing and stockpiling chemical weapons. The Americans seized and then brought back to the United States scientific documentation and the leading specialists on toxic chemical agents. This was the base for the unprecedented scale of development and mass production of new types of toxins and means for their combat employment. With respect to this, it is not surprising that the United States, over many decades, did not join the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use in war of asphyxiating, toxic or other similar gases and bacteriological agents. Currently the U.S. armed forces have in their arsenal up to 300,000 tons of toxins, representing practically all presently known types.

Nerve paralyzing organophosphorus compounds constitute the main arsenal. In the Western press this group of toxins is often called nerve gases since they cause primarily a profound disorder of nervous system function. Profound disorders which are incompatible with life develop in the organism. Severe shortness of breath resulting from bronchial tube spasms and mucus obstruction, uncontrolled vomiting, and convulsions also appear. In the case of severe affection death occurs from paralysis of the respiratory muscles.

Known nerve gas variants are sarin and soman. Americans consider sarin primary. Its vapors are most toxic. In the early 1950's a new variant of nerve paralyzing toxins was obtained, which was called V-gas in the United States. The main difference between this toxin and those previously mentioned is that it easily penetrates the organism not only through the respiratory system, but also through the skin. As it evaporates more slowly than sarin, V-gas remains longer on contaminated articles and terrain, and can inflict heavy casualties for a longer period of time.

Large quantities of mustard gas continue to be stored in U.S. Army warehouses. Characteristically, it is viewed by the American hawks as a highly effective toxin distinguished by its simplicity, low production cost and powerful harmful effect. But the U.S. militarists do not stop at such blasphemy. Now they are stubbornly perfecting psychochemical toxins which attack the human brain centers, destroying their normal functioning. As a result the victim suffers grave psychological disorders. He acts as though he were psychologically ill and naturally loses all combat effectiveness.

Recently American journalists Martin Lee and Bruce (Shlane) published a book entitled "The CIA and a Generation of Psychochemical Weapons." They report that the Pentagon has been developing psychochemical toxins in coordination with the CIA since the early 1950's. During this time more than 400 compounds have been studied and tested on people! The authors remark that the Pentagon is seeking a substance which "can cloud the minds of the entire world." General Stubbs, former chief of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, stated that these toxins are necessary as "quick acting means of conducting warfare and deterrence."

Cynicism is without bounds. The CIA was counting on finding among the psychochemical toxins "valuable" ones for use against participants in the liberation movement and demonstrators representing the progressive public, and for "softening the brains" of dissidents. And our U.S. "freedom lovers" even adopted BZ toxins into their army. They are equipped with specially developed chemical munitions; in particular M-16 generators and M-44 cluster bombs. The search for other toxins affecting the psyche is also underway. These include such compounds as LSD, mescaline, and several derivatives of benzilic acid.

The U.S. Army's arsenal of chemical weapons includes various irritating agents. These include primarily those substances known in American nomenclature as CS and CR. This group still includes chloroacetophenane and adamsite and mixtures of these substances, which have been retained for many years. They all cause severe irritation of the airways passage, sharp pain the eyes, and prolific tearing. Large doses may cause nausea, vomiting, chest pain and other serious disorders. The American "peace lovers" widely employ CS and CR type compounds even against their own people in dispersing demonstrations.

Toxins are stored in specialized containers or in munitions ready for use. According to the press, the Pentagon currently has approximately 100 types of various chemical munitions, including up to 3 million artillery rounds (105mm with sarin, 155mm with sarin or UX), and several tens of thousands of aerial bombs. Chemical weapons arsenals and depots are found not only in the United States, but also in the Pacific Ocean zone (Johnson Island in the Central Pacific, and Okinawa). The Americans are storing up to 10,000 munitions, filled primarily with paralyzing nerve toxins, in warehouses in the FRG. Half of these are concentrated in underground storage areas near the town of Fischbach in the vicinity of Pirmasens. U.S. chemical weapons are also located in the United Kingdom and Italy.

Throughout history not a single other state has used chemical weapons on the scale of the United States. During the period of their aggression in Southeast Asia, wide usage began in late 1961 with the sanction of the U.S. President. This barbarous activity continued for an entire decade. On the territory of Vietnam alone, the United States used 96,000 tons of herbicides (primarily orange, white, and blue compounds) and more than 7,000 tons of toxins, primarily CS. This was a scorched earth tactic. Herbicides were disseminated in huge doses: dozens and even hundreds of kilograms per hectare. The result was simple: complete destruction of vegetation, extermination of the animal world, and severe harm to people.

Flouting international agreements, and in particular violating the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Americans used chemical smoke-pots and hand grenades, chemical aerial bombs and artillery shells. Fatal concentrations were created over large areas. As a result Vietnam suffered deforestation of roughly half of its richest forests. In a number of areas, semi-deserts formed in their stead. Broad sowed areas became useless. Even now in areas of intensive use of herbicides, burnt and lifeless villages stick out in place of jungles, recalling the evil deeds of the American militarists. Massive loss of cattle occurred in cattle breeding areas. Huge numbers of wild animals perished. But the people suffered most terribly. More than 45 million Vietnamese received varying degrees of injury. Many of these developed serious cancers, blood diseases, liver and nervous system disorders. Frequently the children suffer birth defects.

Having committed monstrous crimes in Vietnam, the American warriors do not feel the slightest remorse. For them Vietnamese land and all of Southeast Asia were merely a proving ground. Having developed these weapons as required, they are prepared to use them should certain situations arise, in any other area of the world. The former commander of the NATO Northern Army Group, General Hackett, unceremoniously affirmed that a third world war will turn Europe into a black wasteland as a result of the use of nuclear and chemical weapons and napalm. For American generals, Europe, like the other regions of the world as well, is merely a theater of military operations against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and progressive forces.

However, peaceloving mankind is intensifying its struggle against the criminal plans of the American militarists. More and more people on the planet are joining the voice of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, which are demanding that the arms race be curbed, and in particular that the development, production and use of chemical weapons be banned.

The strong protest of the peoples of the world forced the American administration to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union on a number of problems of disarmament, even including the banning of chemical weapons. The USSR displayed maximum flexibility in discussing this issue. Our country introduced a number of proposals which made it possible rapidly to find a way to work out a mutually acceptable convention. But the U.S. representatives impeded the effort in every way possible. Procedural questions were artificially complicated. Unfounded difficulties were endlessly raised in the area of verification of the agreement. In 1980 the negotiations were broken off after the twelfth round through the fault of the United States.

Actual events show that, as before, the U.S. side shows no interest in developing negotiations and is using the time to improve its chemical weapons. This hypocritical policy is now well-known.

The American administration shows the most concern, not about the success of negotiations, but about pushing through congress a new 5-year program for increasing chemical armaments at an overall cost of up to 10 billion dollars. The main element of this program, according to the declarations of Pentagon representatives, is to expand the production and stockpiling of a new generation of chemical weapons--binary munitions employing paralytic nerve gases.

A feature of these munitions is that they contain two chemical substances which interact and form deadly nerve gas during the flight of the munition to the target and its explosion. It is an even more refined and dangerous chemical weapon than those previously existing. In the opinion of American specialists it may be produced and stored in circumvention of all international agreements, since the component substances contained in the binary munitions can also be used for non-military purposes. Yes, and the monitoring--the production of these weapons will become more and more difficult.

The American maniacs are hurrying. Binary artillery rounds of various calibers have already entered the U.S. Army armaments. Soon new chemical munitions for main artillery systems and aerial chemical bombs will enter the forces, as will Lance missiles and cruise missiles armed with toxins. Large-scale production of binary munitions is planned for the assembly plant near Pine Bluff, Arkansas. It is planned that the overall quantity of chemical munitions will increase to 5 million items in the next few years. According to Pentagon plans, most of them are to enter American chemical weapons supply depots in Western Europe--the FRG, Italy, the United Kingdom and other NATO countries. Chemical weapons storage depots in the FRG, near Fischbach, are being reconstructed and still further enlarged. Washington is also nurturing plans to equip missiles for warships and strategic bombers based at the Diego Garcia military base in the Indian Ocean with binary chemical rounds.

Along with the expanding production of binary munitions an intensive search for new toxins is underway in the United States. Ultra-toxic toxins are being developed against which there are not yet any protective means. In particular, research is underway in the area of animal and plant derived toxins.

The Pentagon is currently also adopting organizational measures to increase the preparedness of the armed forces for employing chemical weapons. The position of Deputy Assistant Secretary, having the task of coordinating preparations for conducting military operations under conditions in which chemical weapons are employed, has been established in the Department of Defense. There is a coordinating committee concerning questions of chemical warfare, which includes representatives of a committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Armed Services and the intelligence community. Chemical brigades have been introduced into the Army Corps, and chemical battalions into the division. Soldiers are trained to use chemical weapons in special centers. One of them is Fort McClellan in northern Alabama. Here Army units train for chemical warfare under conditions maximally approaching a combat environment. Soldiers go for days without removing protective masks and clothing. They do this literally under the fear of death: the facilities in which the exercises take place are contaminated with military toxins. Of late the use of chemical weapons is being systematically mastered during the course of exercises and troops maneuvers, especially in Western Europe. According to foreign press reports, the U.S. Department of Defense recently published a brochure, "The Conduct of Military Ground and Air Operations." This document openly states that the United States plans to conduct an initial tactical nuclear strike against the countries of the socialist community, with simultaneous employment of chemical weapons. As they say, commentary is unnecessary.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### COMMENTARY ON HISTORY, NATURE OF 'VACUUM BOMB'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 83 p 3

[Article by Engr-Col N. Ivanov: "What Is a 'Vacuum Bomb'?" according to foreign press materials]

[Text] How should the terms "vacuum bomb" and "space explosion bomb" be understood, when were such weapons first employed, and where can they be located?

These questions were posed in their letters to the editors by our readers V. Safutun, A. Yevstaf'yev, I. Aleksandrov, A. Puzikov, D. Yesenovich, M. Panchenko, and others.

Well, who does not doubt that military circles of the United States used Israel's aggression against Lebanon to check its new weapons systems? They also include the so-called "vacuum bomb" which was dropped over Beirut on 6 August of last year. As a result of the explosion, an eight-story residential building was completely destroyed and about 300 peaceful citizens, primarily women and children, were killed or wounded.

The operating principle of such a bomb can be presented in a simplified way in the following manner. A conventional charge or liquid fuel is placed in a special casing. Upon explosion, since there is no oxidizer the fuel does not flame up, but only atomizes, evaporates, and mixes with the oxygen, forming a cloud of fuel-air mixture with a radius of about 15 and a thickness of 2-3 meters. It is this which is ignited (exploded) in several places by special detonators.

At the moment of explosion, a relative vacuum is formed within the casing from the fuel-air mixture (hence the name "vacuum"). Something similar to the bursting of the envelope of a balloon with the evacuation of the air occurs. This also served as the basis for such ammunition also to be called "space explosion ammunition."

With the explosion of the mixture a supersonic air shock wave with a great over-pressure is formed. It is also the main damage-causing factor.

According to reports in the foreign press, the explosive energy of a gas-air mixture is several times greater than what is released with the explosion of conventional high explosive (HE) equal in weight. Thus, for example, the power of the explosion of a mixture formed from an aerosol of ethylene oxide is 3-5 times greater than the explosive power of the same weight of trinitrotoluene. This is why foreign

specialists believe that space explosion ammunition occupies an intermediate position between nuclear and conventional ammunition.

Work on ammunition of this type has been conducted in the United States for more than 20 years. It was employed for the first time in 1969 in Vietnam. This was the CBU-55B bomb clusters which contain three bomblets each on the basis of ethylene oxide (33.6 kg in each). After the dropping of the clusters from an Iroquois helicopter (Photo 1) [not reproduced] the bomblets separated and dropped to the ground on a brake parachute. On contacting the ground, an explosive charge was activated, and the cloud of gas-air mixture which was formed exploded with a delay of 0.125 seconds.

The overpressure in the shock-wave front 15 meters from the center of the explosion of such a mixture usually equals approximately 30 kg per square centimeter, and due to the reflected wave it may double and reach 60 kg per square centimeter. Such a pressure is sufficient to destroy various area and point targets and for the triggering of mines on the surface as well as covered with dirt. The explosions of CBU-55/B 500-pound clusters was also widely used for the creation of jungle landing pads for helicopters.

As reported by the journal ARMY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, in the middle of the 1970's the SLU-FAE mine-clearing system (Photo 2) [not reproduced] was created in the United States on the base of the M548 Army tracked transporter. It is a 30-tube unit for firing the Zuni 127-mm free rockets. Their over-caliber warhead is filled with space explosion ammunition. In addition to 38.6 kg of propylene oxide, the warhead contains a central bursting charge, two detonators, and electronic and mechanical (with a feeler 1.8 meters long) fuzes. The rocket has a cylindrical drum-shaped tail and brake parachute in the tail which opens on command of a timing mechanism.

The launcher's firing range is 300-1,000 meters. Uniform distribution of the points of fall of the rockets in the assigned interval of range of fire is ensured using a brake parachute and an intervalometer. When the warhead feeler strikes the ground the explosive charge destroys its thin-walled housing and the propylene oxide is scattered, forming a cloud with a diameter of 14 meters at a height of 4 meters. It is also exploded by detonators with a delay of up to four seconds. The pressure which arises with a space explosion explodes the minefield. Tests of the SLU-FAE system showed that with one salvo it can make a passage 12 meters wide and 300 meters long in a minefield.

In the middle of the 1970's, aerial clusters appeared with space explosion ammunition for use with light ground-attack aircraft and with the F-4 Phantom-2 fighters. In the last decade, the United States has been conducting vast work on the study of new formulas for mixtures which possess great explosive energy. They are being created for second- and third-generation ammunition which was also employed by the Israeli aggressors.

According to the estimate of foreign specialists, space-explosion ammunition can also be used to combat targets on the surface of the water. It is believed that the explosion of a 500-kilogram charge for a space explosion, depending on the formula of the ammunition, will create a shock wave in which there will be an overpressure equal to 0.42 kg per square centimeter at a distance of 85 and even 200 meters. The



Pentagon is also conducting the development of ammunition of this type to combat anti-ship rockets and aerial targets. Long-range plans include the creation of mixtures for a powerful space explosion beneath the water and in space.

In short, military-political circles of the United States, disregarding the demands of the peace-loving public, are looking for new types of barbarous weapons of aggression and blackmail, thus hoping to attain military superiority over other countries.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### COMMENTARY ON ASSAULT LANDINGS IN FALKLANDS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jan 83 p 5

[Article by Capt 2d Rank Ye. Nikitin: "A Colonial Adventure in the South Atlantic"; according to foreign press materials]

[Text] The armed conflict in the South Atlantic, responsibility for which Washington bears along with London, graphically demonstrated the intentions of the United States and Great Britain not to deviate from the policy of colonialism or from the militaristic course which is directed toward the creation of crisis situations and the whipping up of international tension.

Today, we conclude publication of a series of articles on the Anglo-Argentine conflict. The first article was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 11 January, and the second--on 14 January of this year.

#### 3. The Landing of the Assault Force and Troop Operations Ashore

The landing of the assault force and its operations ashore were, in essence, the main military operation on the results of which the overall result of the Anglo-Argentine conflict depended. Therefore, the British command detailed for participation in it a significant contingent of Marine and Ground Forces--more than 8,000 men.

The shipment of troops to the area of the Falklands (Malvinas) was accomplished in stages, primarily by landing ships and passenger vessels which were requisitioned and chartered from private companies. A part of the force was delivered on Hercules transport aircraft and combat ships.

The landing of the assault force on the Falklands (Malvinas) and combat operations ashore began more than a month and a half after the start of the conflict. The British command used this time for the buildup of forces. During this period, the landing ships and vessels with troops and the transports with combat equipment and ammunition assembled northeast and east of the archipelago under the cover of combat ships and outside the reach of Argentine aviation. By the start of the landing operation (21 May) the number of troops intended for operations ashore reached 5,000 men. Combat equipment numbered at least 30 Scorpion light tanks, about 100 artillery pieces and mortars, and armored personnel carriers.

The Argentine garrison on the islands included 11,000 men as well as more than 90 tanks and armored personnel carriers and other combat equipment. Its main forces were concentrated in Port Stanley--on the eastern part of the island of East Falkland (Soledad).

An important factor which contributed to the success of the landing operation is considered to be the landing of a British reconnaissance-sabotage group on the island. For two days prior to the start of the landing of the assault force they disclosed virtually completely the disposition of the Argentine troops and undefended sections of the coast, and they reconnoitered the paths of possible routes for the advance of the assault forces on the shore. Great significance was had by the fact that the saboteurs knocked out the radar station with the aid of which the Argentines executed the monitoring of the forces of the British squadron which was located north of the island of East Falkland (Soledad). It is namely from this direction that the main assault operation was subsequently conducted in the area of San Carlos (on the northwest part of the island).

The British devoted great attention to the spreading of false information concerning the times and place for the landing of the main forces. For this purpose, for example, the "loss" of a "secret document" on the shore by the reconnaissance group, in which the area south of Port Stanley was indicated as the site for the landing of the first assault force, was feigned. This false information was reinforced by specially conducted radio conversations between the ships of the squadron and by the landing of small demonstration groups at points distant from San Carlos.

The San Carlos area was selected on the basis that there were almost no Argentine troops there and there were sectors of the coast suitable for landing. The landing was executed on the night of 20-21 May simultaneously on four landing-accessible beaches. Opposition by forces of only one platoon was offered only on one of them. The assault force disembarked by the combined method: using naval assault-landing craft and helicopters. After several hours the first echelon of the assault landing force had consolidated on the shore, Rapier antiaircraft missile complexes had been installed on the surrounding hills, and Scorpion light tanks and 105-mm artillery pieces had been set out on the most threatened directions. Air cover of the forces which had landed was accomplished by Harrier aircraft for which temporary landing strips had been hastily prepared on the shore.

During a week, the British Marines and paratroopers strengthened and expanded the beachhead. Then they moved in two groups, encountering no substantial resistance and capturing weakly defended points on the way to Port Stanley. On the approaches to Port Stanley, they succeeded in capturing the commanding hills.

The Argentine command, demoralized by the actions of the British, could not interfere with the landing of the first and subsequent echelons of the British assault force in the area of San Carlos. In the absence of supplies from the mainland and without replenishment of weapons and, especially, of ammunition, the Argentine garrison did not display great combat activity. Although, as the British acknowledge, the Argentine soldiers and officers displayed steadfastness and valor in battles.

After the landing of the first assault force in San Carlos, when the British ships and vessels approached the coast, Argentine airplanes inflicted considerable losses

on them. Two frigates and a container-carrier ship with helicopters and other combat equipment on board were sunk and a number of combat and assault landing ships and big vessels which covered and supported the landing of subsequent assault forces and the actions of British troops ashore received serious damage.

Despite the losses, especially in ships, the British command landed two more assault forces--this time in the immediate proximity of Port Stanley which was completely blockaded from land as well as from the sea. As a result of the attack by the British troops which was begun on the night of 12-13 June, the garrison of Port Stanley ceased resistance.

In analyzing the combat operations ashore, foreign military specialists note several aspects. First, the attainment of tactical surprise by the British, as a result of which the landing of the main assault force in the area of San Carlos was conducted covertly, under the conditions of a virtual absence of resistance on the part of the enemy. Second, their use of contemporary technical means which provided the capability to execute the landings of the assault force and its advancement on the coast primarily during darkness, which hindered the offering of resistance by the Argentine troops, especially by aviation. Also noted is the significance of the broad employment of helicopters, not only during the landing of the assault force but also for the rapid transfer of personnel to new lines and for the transportation of heavy combat equipment, ammunition, and items of supply, which is especially important under conditions of a poorly developed road network and difficult terrain relief.

Combat operations on East Falkland (Soledad) confirmed the necessity for the organization of reliable air defense at all stages of an assault landing operation. This also pertains to defending troops. Evidently, it is not by chance that the Argentine General O. Parad reproached the Air Force command for the fact that it did not provide sufficient air cover for the troops on the islands at the decisive moments of combat operations.

It is known that British aggression in the South Atlantic relied on the broad support on the part of the United States and NATO. Its lessons and the experience acquired are being studied for their possible use in the interests of the biggest imperialist bloc which is directed by the United States and the Pentagon's hegemonistic global strategy. Thus, in the White Book "Lessons of the Falkland Campaign" prepared by the British Defense Ministry, it speaks about the program of measures directed toward providing the army with additional contemporary equipment to increase its mobility and combat capability "for the conduct of operations within the framework of NATO and beyond its limits." The Ministry of Defense requested an additional 1 billion pounds sterling for new types of armaments.

Mentioned among the factors which ensured the "victory of British arms" is the offensive nature of the combat training conducted in accordance with the plans of the NATO military command. For example, the former commander of the British Marines, General Moore, and the commander of the forces which landed in the Falklands (Malvinas), General Thompson, explained the successful operations of these forces by the experienced which they had acquired earlier in the course of combat training in Northern Norway.

In turn, it was noted in NATO headquarters that the lessons of the war in the South Atlantic are extremely valuable for the Rapid Deployment Force of the United States

"in case of a crisis in the Near East or in the area of the Persian Gulf." The American journal U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT writes about the same subject. The attacker," it points out, "needs an area for the assembly of people and ammunition in some proximity to the area of military operations. The British use of Ascension Island stresses the value of such American air posts as Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean." And according to data in the newspaper BALTIMORE SUN, American specialists look upon the operations of the British assault force in the Falklands (Malvinas) as "obvious lessons which are applicable in the much vaster European zone."

Such, in the opinion of Western specialists, is the significance of the Falkland campaign. However, far from everything connected with it has been made publicly known. To whip up chauvinistic, militaristic passions in the country, official London is doing everything to present this adventure in a favorable light. In a report of a special committee of the House of Commons on defense, the existence of "reasons which permit keeping the entire truth secret from the public" is admitted. In light of such a cynical revelation, reports appearing in the foreign press that British ships, including those sunk by Argentine aviation, had nuclear weapons on board are acquiring even more sinister significance.

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